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Abstract
This paper studies experimentally the impact of the split-award statute, where the state takes
a share of the plaintiﬀ’s punitive damage award, on litigation outcomes. Our ﬁndings indicate
that dispute rates are signiﬁcantly lower when bargaining is performed under the split-award in-
stitution. Defendants’ litigation losses and plaintiﬀs’ net compensation are signiﬁcantly reduced
by the split-award statute.
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Tort reform in the U.S. has typically been motivated by the common perception that excessive
punitive damage awards1 have contributed to the escalation of liability insurance premiums.2 Some
reforms take the form of caps or limits on punitive damage awards while others mandate that a
portion of the award be allocated to the plaintiﬀ with the remainder going to the state.3 These latter
reforms, called “split-awards,” have been implemented in Alaska, California,4 Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Oregon, and Utah.5 In addition, New Jersey and Texas have contemplated,
but not yet adopted, split-award statutes (White 2002).
Theoretical models of litigation have been developed to study the eﬀects of split-awards on
litigants’ behavior and likelihood of trial. However, there are no empirical tests of these models,
perhaps because most litigation outcomes are partially or totally unobserved by researchers so that
data sources are rarely available (Daughety 2000). The proposed research is an attempt to test,
using experimental methods, the eﬀect of the split-award institution on the likelihood of trial and
1Justice O’Connor stated that punitive damage awards had “skyrocketed” more than 30 times in the previous ten
years, with an increase in the highest award from $250,000 to $10,000,000 (Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282, 1989).
2In 1990, the total tort liability payments were approximately $65 billion, of which 93.5 percent were made by
liability insurers (O’Connell, 1994).
3The magnitude of the resources currently spent in the U.S. tort and, therefore, diverted from economic activities,
has generated an urgency for further reform of the tort system. The 2004 Economic Report of the President devotes a
whole chapter to the tort system, describing its eﬀects and proposing reforms. “Expenditures in the U.S. tort system
were $233.4 billion in 2002, equal to 2.2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), more than twice the amount spent
on new automobiles in 2002. The expansive tort system has a considerable impact on the U.S. economy. Tort liability
leads to lower spending on research and development, higher health care costs, and job losses” (Economic Report of
the President, 2004, p. 203).
4On August 16, 2004, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed the state budget legislation SB 1102 as an “urgency”
matter, becoming eﬀective immediately instead of January the 1st of next year. The SB 1102 provided that 75 percent
of all punitive damages were payable to the state; that is, split-awards were enacted in that legislation (Metropolitan
News Enterprise; August 18, 2004). Given that California has approximately 10 percent of the U.S. population, the
eﬀects of this statute may have a great impact on the U.S. tort system.
5Statutes vary with the state: the base for computation of the state’s share can be the gross punitive award or
the award net of attorney’s fees, the state’s share can be 50 percent, 60 percent or 75 percent and, the destination of
the state’s funds can be the Treasury, the Department of Human Services or indigent victims funds. For details, see
Dodson (2000), Epstein (1994), Stevens(1994), and Sloane (1993).
Legal commentators have focused their analyses of theses statutes on their eﬀects on the plaintiﬀ’s windfall (i.e.,
any amount in excess of the costs of pursuing the punitive claim) and the constitutionality of the reform (Evans
1998, Epstein 1994, Stevens, 1994, Sloane 1993). Commentators argue that in contrast to caps that reduce both
the plaintiﬀ’s windfall and the deterrence eﬀect of the punitive awards, the split-award statute constitutes a “move
toward eﬀectuating the true purpose of punitive damages” (Sloane, p. 473). They claim that split-awards reduce the
plaintiﬀ’s windfall but maintain adequate levels of deterrence and punishment. In addition, split-awards allow the
plaintiﬀs to receive a share of the awards for payment of attorney fees and rewards for their civil duty as “private
attorney generals” (Case Note, 1993; Dodson, 2000; Evans, 1998; Epstein, 1994; Stevens, 1994; Sloane, 1993).
1the level of care chosen by potential injurers. We adopt a simpliﬁed version of Landeo and Nikitin’s
(2005) model as a theoretical framework.
Among previous formal studies of the split-award statute is the work of Kahan and Tuckman
(1995). They construct a simultaneous-move game between a plaintiﬀ and a defendant and ﬁnd
that, in the absence of agency problems between plaintiﬀs and lawyers, split-awards reduce the
plaintiﬀ’s litigation eﬀort and expenses and, consequently, reduce the expected amount paid by
the defendant.6 Their framework does not allow for an analysis of the eﬀects of split-awards on
the likelihood of trial because the pre-trial bargaining stage is not explicitly modeled. Daughety
and Reinganum (2003) examine the eﬀects of the split-award reform on the likelihood of trial
and settlement amounts by modeling the pre-trial bargaining as a strategic game of incomplete
information between two Bayesian players, an informed defendant7 and an uninformed plaintiﬀ,
using signaling and screening games setups. They ﬁnd that holding ﬁling constant, split-award
statutes simultaneously lower settlement amounts and the likelihood of trial.
Landeo and Nikitin extend the analysis of the split-award reform by exploring its eﬀects not only
on litigation outcomes but also on the potential injurer’s level of care.8 They construct a strategic
model of litigation consisting of two stages. First, there is a potential injurer’s optimization stage,
where a level of care is chosen by the potential injurer according to its cost of preventing accidents
and the expected litigation loss in case of an accident. The level of care determines the probability
that an accident occurs. If an accident occurs, a litigation stage begins. It is modeled as a signaling-
ultimatum game where two Bayesian risk-neutral parties, an uninformed plaintiﬀ and an informed
defendant,9 negotiate prior to a costly trial.
Consistent with Daughety and Reinganum, their model predicts that under certain conditions,
a decrease in the plaintiﬀ’s share of the award decreases the probability of trial. Given that the
split-award statute applies only when the case is settled in court, the parties have an incentive to
settle out of court in order to cut out the state. In addition, they ﬁnd that a reduction in the
6If agency problems exist, the eﬀects of split-awards are indeterminate.
7The defendant knows the true probability that he will be found liable for gross negligence and made to pay
punitive damages should the case go to trial.
8We will use the terms ﬁrm, defendant and potential injurer interchangeably.
9The defendant possesses private information about its cost of preventing accidents and, therefore, about its level
of care and decision of the court should the case go to trial.
2plaintiﬀ’s share of the award increases the probability of accidents. This eﬀect arises because a
decrease in the plaintiﬀ’s share reduces expected litigation costs. The potential injurer reacts to
these lower expected costs by reducing expenditures on safety.10 Despite the higher likelihood of
accidents under the split-award statute, they ﬁnd, however, that the overall eﬀect of the reform
can be welfare improving if the harm caused by accidents is below some threshold.11
We try here to further Landeo and Nikitin’s research by investigating experimentally the ef-
fects of the split-award statute institution. In assessing the validity of the qualitative theoretical
predictions, our experimental study analyzes the eﬀect of a reduction in the plaintiﬀ’s share of
punitive award on potential injurer’s level of care and litigation outcomes using a two-treatment
between-subjects design.
This experimental investigation is important for two reasons. First, from a theoretical perspec-
tive, these experimental conditions allow us to verify whether the theoretical model has captured
the main variables that determine litigation outcomes and level of care choice. Hence, our ﬁndings
provide information that might contribute to the improvement of game theoretic models of litiga-
tion. Second, the theoretical model shows the impact of the split-award statute on reducing the
likelihood of dispute but at the expense of increasing the likelihood of accidents (by reducing the
potential injurer’s level of care). However, this tort reform has not been previously subjected to any
experimental or ﬁeld-testing. Given that data on the process of decision-making of the participants
involved in lawsuits are not available or are incomplete, conducting an experiment to evaluate the
eﬀects of this litigation institution seems to be a valuable alternative.
Our ﬁndings indicate that dispute rates are signiﬁcantly lower when bargaining is performed
10Polinsky and Che (1991) propose a liability system where the award to the plaintiﬀ diﬀers from the payment
by the defendant (i.e., awards are decoupled). This system makes the defendant’s payment as high as possible, and
therefore, it allows the award to the plaintiﬀ to be lowered. The authors claim that this policy reduces the incentives
to sue without aﬀecting the ﬁrm’s incentives to take care. Note that the reduction in the plaintiﬀ’s award resembles
the split-award statute. However, the split-award reform does not involve an increase in the award paid by the
defendant.
Choi and Sanchirico (2004) show that the system proposed by Polinsky and Che may still have a negative eﬀect
on deterrence. Given that the award paid by defendants is increased, they will spend more on legal advice. This will
force plaintiﬀs to spend more on attorneys as well and discourage some plaintiﬀs from ﬁling a lawsuit.
11If the harm to society due to accidents is low enough, the positive welfare eﬀects of the split-award of lowering
the likelihood of trial (and therefore, reducing the resources spent on litigation) and reallocating economic resources
from expenditures on safety to productive activities may oﬀset the negative welfare eﬀect of increasing the likelihood
of accidents.
3under the split-award institution. Defendant’s litigation expenses and plaintiﬀ’s net compensation
are signiﬁcantly reduced by the split-award statute. The examination of subjects’ decisions suggests
strategic behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical model and pre-
dictions. Section 3 presents a parameterization of the model. Section 4 describes the experimental
design. Section 5 examines the results from the experimental sessions. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 The Theoretical Model
Landeo and Nikitin study theoretically the eﬀects of split-awards on the potential injurer’s level
of care and litigation outcomes. They construct a strategic model of litigation that consists of
two stages. First is a potential injurer’s optimization stage, where a level of care is chosen by the
potential injurer according to its cost of preventing accidents (i.e., type) and the expected litigation
loss in case of an accident. The level of care determines the probability that an accident occurs. If
an accident occurs, a litigation stage begins; modeled as a signaling-ultimatum game between two
Bayesian risk-neutral parties, an uninformed plaintiﬀ and an informed defendant12 negotiate prior
to a costly trial. In their model there is a continuum of potential injurer’s types.
To test experimentally the eﬀects of the split-award institution on level of care and litigation
outcomes, we do not require, however, a continuum of potential injurer’s types. Therefore, we
adapt Landeo and Nikitin’s model by allowing for only two types of potential injurers, avoiding in
this way to add unnecessary complexity to the experimental design.13
2.1 A Simpliﬁed Version of Landeo and Nikitin’s Model
Nature ﬁrst decides the eﬃciency type i of the potential injurer from two possible types (i =1 ,2).
The potential injurer’s type determines its cost ci(y) of achieving a given level of care y.T y p e -
1 potential injurers are less eﬃcient than type-2 potential injurers, so for any level of care y,
12The defendant possesses private information about its cost of preventing accidents and, therefore, about its level
of care and decision of the court should the case go to trial.
13The theoretical predictions derived from this simpliﬁed model are consistent with the predictions from the original
model.
4c1(y) >c 2(y) (i.e., potential injurers of type 1 need to spend more to achieve the same level of
care). The share of type-1 potential injurers is φ<1. The realization of i is revealed only to the
potential injurer, but φ is common knowledge. We deﬁne λ(y) as the probability of an accident
that depends on the level of care y, and assume that the higher the level of care y, the lower the
probability of an accident (i.e., the probability of accident is a decreasing function of the level of
care).
After observing its type, the potential injurer then decides its optimal level of care, that is,
the one that minimizes its total expected loss L. We deﬁne the defendant’s total expected loss
function as Li = ci(y)+λ(y)l,w h e r el is the expected loss from legal action, diﬀerent for careful
and negligent defendants. The potential injurer is careful if the chosen level of care is greater than
or equal to the due standard of care ¯ y (exogenous and common knowledge parameter); otherwise,
the potential injurer is negligent.14
If an accident occurs, the litigation stage starts. The plaintiﬀ ﬁrst decides whether to ﬁle a
lawsuit. This decision is based on her beliefs about the negligence of the defendant conditional on
the occurrence of an accident: with probability q she believes that the defendant is negligent, and
with probability (1−q) she believes that the defendant is careful.15 We assume that the plaintiﬀ’s
expected payoﬀ from suing is positive. Therefore, every injured plaintiﬀ has an incentive to ﬁle a
suit. The pre-trial bargaining negotiation is modeled as a signaling-ultimatum game. The defendant
has the ﬁrst move and makes a settlement proposal. After observing the proposal, the plaintiﬀ, who
knows only φ, decides whether to drop the case, to accept the defendant’s proposal (out-of-court
settlement) or to reject the proposal (bring the case to the trial stage). The plaintiﬀ’s decision is
based on her updated beliefs about the type of defendant she is confronting after observing the
defendant’s proposal. If the plaintiﬀ drops the case, both players incur no legal costs. If the plaintiﬀ
14In real-world settings, punitive damages are awarded only in cases where the defendant is found grossly negligent.
This implies that a care standard is applied.
We refer to ﬁrms who just meet or exceed the care standard for gross negligence as careful ﬁrms and ﬁrms who fail
to meet the standard as negligent ﬁrms.
15These beliefs are taken as parametric for the analysis of the litigation subgame; however, the equilibrium values
for q and (1 − q) will ultimately be determined as part of the overall equilibrium. These equilibrium values depend
on the optimal levels of care chosen by all ﬁrms in the ﬁrst stage of the game, according to their types and expected
litigation costs (that correspond to the equilibrium in the litigation stage). Note that the values of q and (1 − q)a r e
common knowledge, but the ﬁrm’s type and the chosen level of care are known only by the ﬁrm.
5accepts the defendant’s proposal, the game ends, the defendant pays to the plaintiﬀ the proposed
amount, and neither player incurs legal costs.
If the plaintiﬀ rejects the proposal, the plaintiﬀ and the defendant incur legal costs (KP > 0
and KD > 0, respectively). If the defendant is negligent, the court awards punitive damages A>0
to the plaintiﬀ. Under the split-award regime, the plaintiﬀ receives only a fraction f of the total
punitive award, and the state gets a share (1−f) of the award.16 If the plaintiﬀ rejects the proposal
and the defendant is careful, no punitive damages are awarded.17
Note that the total harm caused by an accident includes 1) the private harm caused to the
plaintiﬀ, which we assume is fully compensated with the compensatory damage award; and, 2)
the social harm H, generated by the defendant’s wanton behavior and which warrants punitive
damages. H may include additional losses directly caused to the plaintiﬀ but not compensated with
the compensatory award such as time spent on and emotional distress caused by the compensatory
damages lawsuit and social losses such as undermining of society’s moral standards and institutions
due to the wanton behavior of the defendant.18
Note also that without loss of generality, for the sake of mathematical tractability and given that
our primary goal is to explore the eﬀect of the split-award statute, which applies to the punitive
damage award only, we abstract from compensatory damages.19
The sequence of events in the game is shown in Figure 1.
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
16Note that KP, KD, A and f are exogenous and common knowledge parameters of the model.
17We have restricted the proposal space to [0,fA− KP] (i.e., a proposal cannot be negative or greater than the
maximum amount the plaintiﬀ can get in court).
18Given that we have not assumed that the court perfectly estimates the social harm caused by the negligent
behavior of the defendant, our model allows for H and A to be diﬀerent.
19The model can be modiﬁed to incorporate compensatory damages without altering the qualitative predictions
presented here in the following way. Assume that the court awards compensatory damages CDA(common-knowledge)
whenever t he accidenthappens (i.e., st rictliabilit y applies), butitawards punit ive damages A only if the ﬁrm fails
to achieve the care standard for gross negligence. Assume also bifurcation of trial: two separate trials decide on
compensatory and punitive damage awards, that the compensatory damages game has the same structure as the
punitive damages game presented here, and that legal costs, KPCDA and KDCDA, are paid by the plaintiﬀ and
defendant, respectively, only in case of trial. Then, in case of an accident, the plaintiﬀ and the defendant do not have
asymmetric information with regard to prospective compensatory damage awards, and therefore, they settle out of
court. Thus, every defendant will oﬀer CDA− KPCDA, and every plaintiﬀ will accept.
Thus, the total loss function is given by L = c(y(n),n)+λ(y(n))(CDA−KPCDA+l), where l is the expected loss
from legal action related to punitive damages. It is easy to show that all qualitative results presented in Sections 2
and 3 will hold.
6The model is solved backwards. We start by ﬁnding the solution of the litigation stage, using the
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept and the universal divinity reﬁnement (Banks and Sobel 1987).
Second, we analyze the defendant’s optimization problem and ﬁnd the defendant’s optimal level of
care. This level of care depends on the defendant’s type and the litigation stage equilibrium.20
In equilibrium, (1) the more eﬃcient ﬁrms (type-2 ﬁrms) choose to be careful (optimal level of
care greater than or equal to the due care standard)21 while the less eﬃcient ﬁrms (type-1 ﬁrms)
choose to be negligent (optimal level of care lower than the due care standard), and (2) some
lawsuits are dropped, some are resolved out-of-court, and some go to trial.
2.2 Qualitative Predictions
The qualitative predictions of the model are summarized in Propositions 1–5.22
Proposition 1. A decrease in the plaintiﬀ’s share of the punitive award, f, reduces the aggregate
level of care.
A reduction in f decreases the expected litigation loss for the defendant, and it reacts by
lowering its level of care.
Proposition 2. A decrease in the plaintiﬀ’s share of the punitive award, f, increases the probability
of an accident.
By assumption, the probability of an accident is negatively related to the level of care. By
Proposition 1, a decrease in f reduces the aggregate level of care. Then, the probability of an
accident will increase.
20The solution to the model is presented in Appendix A, available on the JEBO website at
www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase.
The solution of the litigation stage is the same for both the original model and the simpliﬁed version presented
here. The proofs related to the optimization problem of the defendant and to the qualitative predictions, presented
in Appendices A and B, are diﬀerent from the original model proofs. However, the qualitative predictions are the
same for both models.
21If type-2 ﬁrms are very eﬃcient, then their optimal level of care will be greater than the due care standard;
otherwise, their optimal level of care will be equal to the due care standard.
22The proofs of the propositions are presented in Appendix B, available on the JEBO website at
www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase.
7We can make unambiguous predictions about the unconditional and conditional probabilities of
trial if type-2 potential injurers just meet the due care standard. It is important to note, however,
that this condition is suﬃcient (but not necessary) for the results of Proposition 3 to hold.
Proposition 3. A decrease in the plaintiﬀ’s share of the punitive award, f, reduces the unconditional
and the conditional probabilities of trial if type-2 potential injurers just meet the due care standard.
Given that the split-award statute applies only when the case is settled in court, the parties
have an incentive to settle out of court in order to cut out the state. Note that given that litigation
costs are paid by the parties only in case of a trial, split-awards also reduce the expected total
litigation costs paid by both parties.
We deﬁne the plaintiﬀ’s rejection threshold as the proposal level below which all (positive)
proposals are rejected by the plaintiﬀ.23
Proposition 4. A decrease in the plaintiﬀ’s share of the punitive award, f, reduces the plaintiﬀ’s
rejection threshold and the defendant’s equilibrium (positive) proposal.
Under the split-award, the plaintiﬀ expects to obtain a lower payoﬀ at trial, so the plaintiﬀ is
more willing to accept lower out-of-court settlement proposals and the defendant, anticipating the
behavior of the plaintiﬀ, will make lower settlement oﬀers.
Proposition 5. A decrease in the plaintiﬀ’s share of the punitive award, f, reduces the defendant’s
expected loss from legal action.
Under the split-award, the plaintiﬀ’s rejection threshold (and the defendant’s equilibrium pro-
posal) and the dispute rate are lower. Therefore, the split-award reduces the defendant’s expected
loss from legal action.
Note that a welfare analysis of the split-award tort reform should consider all its individual
eﬀects, such as, the eﬀect on the aggregate expenditure on care, the harm that an accident causes
23We do notconsider here proposals equal t o zero.
8to society, and the costs of litigation.24
Deﬁne the social cost of accidents as the sum of aggregate expenditures on accident preven-
tion, unconditional expected damage that accidents cause to society, and unconditional expected
litigation costs. A decrease in f reduces the level of care of low-type ﬁrms and does not aﬀect the
level of care of high-type ﬁrms. Therefore the aggregate expenditures on accident prevention must
decrease. In addition, given that a decrease in f lowers the level of care and, therefore, increases
the probability of an accident, we can conclude that a decrease in f increases the unconditional
expected damage that accidents cause to society. Finally, assuming that the high-type ﬁrms just
meet the standard of care, a reduction in f reduces the unconditional probability of trial. Hence,
if the level of the harm an accident causes to society is suﬃciently low (for a particular value of f),
we may expect that split-awards decrease the social costs of accidents.
Finally, note that when y is large enough (which can be interpreted as overdeterrence), the
positive eﬀect of the split-award reform outweighs the negative eﬀect. In fact, for suﬃciently large
values of y, the probability of an accident approaches zero, so, a marginal change in f has almost
no impact on the probability of an accident and, therefore, almost no eﬀect on the unconditional
expected damage that accidents cause to society. In addition, given that λ(y) is very close to zero,
a marginal reduction in y due to a reduction in f has a negligible eﬀect on the probability of an
accident caused by a careful defendant. Therefore it has a negligible impact on the unconditional
probability of trial and on the expected litigation costs.25 Hence the only non-negligible (and
positive) welfare eﬀect of lower f will be the eﬀect on reducing the aggregate expenditures on
accident prevention.
3 Model Parameterization
The model parameterization presented in this section will be used in the experimental design. The
functional forms and parameter values chosen follow the assumptions on primitives of the model26
and are presented below.
24The welfare analysis is presented formally in Appendix C, available on the JEBO website at
www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase.
25Note that this analysis does not rely on the assumption that the high-eﬃciency type just meets the standard.
26Primitives of the model are all the conditions stated at the beginning of Section 2.1 and in the Appendix A.
9Let ni denote the eﬃciency factor associated with the type-i potential injurer. Assume that
the expenditures-on-care function is ci(y)=
(1−ni)y3
105 and the probability of an accident is λ(y)=
(1−0.001y)2. Therefore, the potential injurer’s total expected loss is L =
(1−ni)y3
105 +(1−0.001y)2l,
where l is the expected litigation cost in case of an accident; l = fA−KP for the negligent potential
injurer (y<¯ y), and l =
(fA−KP)
A+KD KD for the careful one (y ≥ ¯ y).
Diﬀerentiating the total expected loss function with respect to y and setting to zero, we obtain
∂L
∂y
=
30(1 − ni)y2 − 2(1000 − y)l
106 =0 . (1)
Solving for y, in case the potential injurer chooses an interior solution, yields the optimal level of
care
y =
−l +
 
l2 +6 0 ,000l(1 − ni)
30(1 − ni)
. (2)
Assume the following parameter values: n2 = .99, n1 = −.6; the share of the low-skill potential
injurers (Type-1 potential injurers) φ = .8; A = 500, KD = KP = 100, ¯ y = 290. Assume also that
the potential injurer’s proposal S can be S =0o rS>100.27 Consider two values for f: f =1
(no split-award regime, all punitive damages award going to the plaintiﬀ) and f = .5 (split-award
regime, only half of the punitive damages award going to the plaintiﬀ).28
Under the no-split award regime (f = 1), the unique divine Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE)
is as follows. For the type-2 potential injurer, 1) the optimal level of care will be y2 = 480 > ¯ y,t h a t
27We have limited the set of possible oﬀers to S =0a n dS>100 in order to rule out the separating PBE that do
not survive the Banks and Sobel’s divinity reﬁnement. See Appendix A for description of these other PBE that are
notdivine PBE. Therefore, under t his setof possible oﬀers, t here is a unique PBE.
28Our model parameterization satisﬁes all the model assumptions on primitives and, therefore, the predictions
derived from these assumptions. In addition, this examination satisﬁes the theoretical prediction stated in Proposition
3 without relying on the suﬃcient (but not necessary) condition (which implies that the type-2 defendants just meet
the due care standard). Instead, it assumes the existence of two very diﬀerent types of defendants characterized by
very diﬀerent values for the parameter n, the eﬃciency factor. Type 1, the low eﬃciency type chooses to be negligent
in equilibrium, and type 2, the very eﬃcient type, exceeds the due care standard in equilibrium.
The chosen functional forms for the expenditure-on-care c
i(y) and probability of an accident λ(y) functions are
the simplest possible forms that satisfy the theoretical assumptions. In addition, these functional forms restrict the
expenditure-on-care function to take positive and easy-to-comprehend values (i.e., real numbers between 0 and 1000)
and the probability of accident function to take values between 0 and 1. Note also that given the functional form for
λ, the maximum value that the level of care y can take is ymax = 1000.
Note also that this model parameterization permits us to meet the requirements of the experimental design: 1)
two experimental treatments (split-award and no split-award) suﬃciently diﬀerent from each other (in particular, the
value of f in the case of the split-award needed to be much less than 1 in order to have a plaintiﬀ’s award in case of
trial substantially smaller under the split-award condition), and 2) a probability of an accident suﬃciently high, in
order to have an eﬃcient collection of data related to the litigation stage. Finally, note that the parameters chosen
provide empirically relevant predictions, such as a low probability of trial.
10is, the high-skilled potential injurer chooses to be careful and its level of y is above the standard;
this level of care corresponds to a level of expenditure on care equal to 11, and 2) the defendant
will propose S = 0 with certainty. For the type-2 potential injurer, 1) the optimal level of care
will be y1 = 121 < ¯ y, that is, the low-skilled potential injurer chooses to be negligent; this level of
care corresponds to a level of expenditure on care equal to 28, and 2) the defendant will randomize
between a compensation proposal S = 0 (Prob. = .02) and S = 400 (Prob. = .98). The plaintiﬀ
will randomize between accepting (Prob. = .33) and rejecting (Prob. = .67) an oﬀer S =0a n d
will always accept an oﬀer S = 400.
Under the split-award regime (f = .5), the unique divine PBE is as follows. For the type-2
potential injurer, 1) the optimal level of care will be y2 = 333 > ¯ y (i.e., the high-skilled potential
injurer still chooses a level of y above the standard), a level of care corresponding to a level of
expenditure on care equal to 4, and 2) the defendant will propose S = 0 with certainty. For the
type-1 potential injurer, 1) the optimal level of care will be y1 =7 6< ¯ y (i.e., the low-skilled
potential injurer chooses to be negligent), a level of care that corresponds to a level of expenditure
on care equal to 7, and 2) the defendant will randomize between a compensation proposal S =0
(Prob. = .07) and S = 150 (Prob. = .93). The plaintiﬀ will randomize between accepting (Prob.
= .75) and rejecting (Prob. = .25) an oﬀer S = 0 and will always accept an oﬀer S = 150.
The qualitative eﬀects of the split-award statute are summarized in Table 1. Split-awards
will reduce the conditional probability of trial (and the expected total litigation costs) but will
also reduce the expenditure on care and, therefore, will increase the probability of accidents. In
addition, the defendant’s equilibrium (positive) proposal and the plaintiﬀ’s rejection threshold will
be lower under the split-award statute. Finally, the defendant’s expected litigation loss from legal
action and the plaintiﬀ’s expected net compensation (net of litigation cost) will be reduced by the
split-award statute.29
[INSERT TABLE 1]
29The eﬀect of split-awards on plaintiﬀ’s expected net compensation is in general ambiguous. However, under this
model parameterization, split-awards unambiguously reduce the plaintiﬀ’s expected net compensation.
114 Experimental Design
In assessing the validity of the qualitative theoretical predictions, our experimental study analyzes
the eﬀect of a reduction in the plaintiﬀ’s share of punitive award on the potential injurer’s level of
care and probability of trial using a two-treatment between-subjects design.
We have speciﬁed the experimental setting in a way that satisﬁes the assumptions of the theory.30
Although our experiment cannot predict the eﬀects of decreasing the plaintiﬀ’s share of punitive
award in richer environments, the experiment can provide a reasonable amount of evidence regarding
whether the reduction of plaintiﬀ’s share of punitive award in an environment such as the one we
have structured here will have the predicted eﬀects.
The experimental design consists of 2 conditions corresponding to two levels of plaintiﬀ’s share
of punitive award f: f = .5, which implies that 50 percent of the punitive award goes to the plaintiﬀ
(split-award condition), and f = 1, which implies that the total punitive award goes to the plaintiﬀ
(no split-award condition).
4.1 The Games
Procedural regularity is accomplished by developing a software program that permits subjects to
play the game by using networked personal computers. The software consists of 2 versions of the
game, reﬂecting the two experimental conditions. The software includes two information boxes (one
containing the role and type of the subject, and the other containing the current balance). Subjects
are provided with written instructions and a simple calculator. The instructions contain information
about the possible choices for each player at each stage of the game, a graphical representation of
the stages of the game, and payoﬀ tables.31
The experiment is a multi-stage game. Subjects play the role of player A (the potential injurer)32
or player B (the plaintiﬀ). We motivate the game to the subjects using a litigation context.33 We
30Even though the theoretical model assumes risk neutrality of players, we have decided not to control for risk
preferences. If the behavior of subjects deviates systematically from the qualitative theoretical predictions based on
risk neutrality, then the model will not capture essential elements of bargaining such as risk preferences. Therefore,
a modiﬁcation of the game theoretic model should be pursued (see Davis and Holt 1993; Smith 1989).
31Software screens and written instructions are available from the authors upon request.
32The potential injurer becomes the defendant after an accident occurs.
33Research on cognitive psychology indicates that subjects may seem like zero intelligence agents when they are
12use a laboratory currency called the “token” (1 token = 2 Canadian cents).34 The parameter
values used in this experiment follow the numerical examination presented in the previous section.
Subjects are each given 800 tokens at the beginning of the game. After roles are randomly assigned
to subjects, the type of potential injurer is drawn by the computer from a binomial distribution
(low-type probability equal to .8 and high-type probability equal to .2). This type is revealed only
to the potential injurer. The plaintiﬀ knows only the probability distribution from which the type
is chosen.
The game consists of at most two stages. In the ﬁrst stage (potential injurer’s decision-making
stage), the potential injurer chooses the level of expenditure on safety (called “investment level” in
the experiment), which is not revealed to the plaintiﬀ. In order to facilitate the understanding of
the game, we simplify the sets of possible expenditure levels for each potential injurer’s type. These
sets, similar in both conditions, consist of three options for the low-type potential injurer (7, 28
and 390 tokens) and three options for the high-type potential injurer (2, 4 and 11 tokens). Each set
contains the equilibrium expenditures speciﬁed by theory (i.e., 7 and 28 for the low-type potential
injurer in conditions 1 and 2, respectively; and, 4 and 11 for the high-type potential injurer in
conditions 1 and 2, respectively). Note that, in order to achieve the standard of care ¯ y = 290, and
given the strong eﬃciency diﬀerence between both types, the high-type injurer needed to spend 4
tokens, and the low-type injurer needed to spend 390 tokens.
The chosen expenditure on care (that determines the probability that an accident occurs) is
subtracted from the potential injurer’s initial endowment. The possible expenditure levels for each
type of potential injurer and the associated probabilities of accident are common knowledge. Given
the level of investment chosen, the computer randomly decides if an accident happens and informs
both players of the result. If the accident does not occur, the game ends. The payoﬀ for the
plaintiﬀ is equal to his initial endowment, and the payoﬀ for the potential injurer is equal to her
placed in the unfamiliar and abstract context of an experiment, even if they function quite adequately in famil-
iar settings. In these cases, subjects will apply their own labels (Loewenstein 1999). Also a study conducted by
experimental economists (Cooper and Kagel 2003) reports compelling evidence for the existence of context eﬀects.
However, we use neutral labels for the subjects’ roles (Player A and Player B) because we consider that the use
of more realistic labels (i.e., potential injurer and plaintiﬀ) will not contribute to the subjects’ understanding of the
game and may generate noise in the subjects’ responses due to the degree of identiﬁcation with the role described by
the label.
34The use of tokens allows us to create a ﬁne payoﬀ grid that underlines the payoﬀ diﬀerences among actions.
13initial endowment minus the chosen level of investment.
If the accident happens, the second stage (litigation stage) starts and a level of damage equal to
200 tokens (equal in both conditions) is deducted from the plaintiﬀ’s initial endowment,35 then the
defendant proposes a level of compensation S (S = 0 or 100 <S≤ defendant’s current balance)
to the plaintiﬀ. The plaintiﬀ needs then to decide whether to accept or reject it. If the plaintiﬀ
rejects the defendant’s proposal, the court decides the award based on the level of investment
chosen by the defendant. If the defendant is negligent, he loses an amount equal to A+KD and the
plaintiﬀ receives a compensation equal to fA− KP; if the defendant is careful, he loses KD,a n d
the plaintiﬀ loses KP.36 Then the game ends. If the plaintiﬀ accepts the proposal, the defendant
pays the plaintiﬀ the proposed amount and the game ends.
4.2 The Experimental Sessions
We ran 8 80-minute sessions of 8 to 12 subjects each (70 subjects in total) at the experimental
laboratory of the University of Alberta School of Business. The subject pool was recruited from
undergraduate classes at the University of Alberta, mostly by posting advertisements on public
boards and on an electronic bulletin board.
At the beginning of each session, written instructions were provided to the subjects. The
instructions about the game and the software used were presented aloud by the experimenter
to create common knowledge.37 Subjects were informed about the random process of allocating
roles and about the randomness and anonymity of the process of forming pairs. Game structure,
35Note that the deduction of 200 tokens can be interpreted as the additional losses directly caused to the plaintiﬀ
but not compensated with the compensatory award. Empirically, the argument of uncompensated losses is used by
supporters of punitive damages. They state that given that plaintiﬀs are not fully compensated with the compensatory
award, they deserve at least part of the punitive damage award. In this way, our experimental design resembles the
situation experienced by plaintiﬀs in lawsuits involving punitive damages. Note also that the deduction of 200 tokens
after an accident occurs makes the task more understandable to subjects without violating the theory. Finally note
that given that both conditions are similar except for the value of f, any diﬀerence between these conditions can be
attributed to the eﬀects of the split-award tort reform.
36The values used are as follows: A = 500, KD = KP = 100, f = 1 in the no-split-award condition and f =0 .5i n
the split-award condition.
37Given that we needed to explain the payoﬀ structure in detail and aloud and given that the payoﬀ structure in
case of trial is diﬀerent for each condition, we run only 1 version of the game per session.
However, internal validity was preserved by random assignment of subjects to conditions. Also, sessions under both
conditions were run each day and similar populations of subjects were used in both conditions. Finally, independence
of observations was guaranteed by the one-shot game characteristic of the experiment.
14initial endowment, possible levels of investment and probabilities of accident associated, payoﬀs,
prior beliefs about the distribution of Player A’s types were common knowledge among subjects.
Subjects were informed only about the game version they were assigned to play. Subjects were
also instructed that they would receive the dollar equivalent of the tokens they held at the end of
the experiment, and they were informed about the token/dollar equivalence. Subjects were then
required to ﬁll out a short questionnaire to ensure their ability to read the information tables.
To ensure subjects’ understanding of the task to be performed, 30 practice games were played
before the play of the actual game. The structure of the practice games and computer screens used
were similar to the actual game; the only diﬀerence was that the practice games were played against
a computer partner while the actual game was played against a human partner. During the ﬁrst
15 practice games the subjects played the role of Player A and during the last 15 practice games
they played the role of Player B. The structure of the practice games allowed subjects to familiarize
themselves with the structure of the game, the likelihood to confront any of the two types of Player
A, and the consequences of the decisions of both players in terms of payoﬀs, without conditioning
subjects’ behavior.
Note that the practice games were not stationary repetitions of the real game. They present
enough variation in roles and decisions of the computer partner to help subjects to understand
the mechanics of the game, while avoiding conditioning their behavior. The number of practice
games was chosen (i) to allow the computer-partner to choose the same number of times each of
the three investment levels per type and, therefore, avoid conditioning the behavior of subjects, (ii)
to help subjects to understand, through the realizations of types, the meaning of the probabilities
of encountering low and high types (80 percent and 20 percent respectively), and (iii) to allow
subjects to play as players A or B the same number of times. The realization of the random
variables “actions of the computer-partner” and the realization of the random variable “accident
occurrence” (determined by the level of investment chosen by Player A, computer or human subject)
were ﬁxed for each practice game, across conditions, subjects and experimental sessions.
During the ﬁrst 15 practice games, where the subject was Player A, (i) 12 times the subject
was a low type Player A (80 percent of the time player A was low type) and 3 times the subject
15was a high type Player A (20 percent of the time Player A was high type), and (ii) the computer-
partner played the acceptance/rejection decision according to the realization of the binomial random
variable “acceptance of proposal” (with probability equal .5 that the realization be acceptance)
that was ﬁxed for each practice game, across conditions, subjects and sessions. During the last 15
practice games, where the subject was Player B, (i) 12 times the computer partner was a low-type
Player A and chose 7, 28, and 390 as a level of investment 4 times each (80 percent of the time
Player A was a low type and each level of investment was played an equal number of times) and 3
times the computer partner was a high-type Player A and chose 2, 4 and 11 as a level of investment
1 time each (20 percent of the time player A is high type and each level of investment was played an
equal number of times), and (ii) if an accident occurred, the computer made a proposal according
to the realization of the uniform random variable “proposal”, which was ﬁxed for each practice
game, across conditions, subjects and sessions.
After the last practice game was played, every participant was randomly assigned a role and
randomly and anonymously paired with another participant and played a one-shot game. Each
player was equally likely to have the role A or B and to be paired with any other participant, and
players were completely anonymous to one another. Communication between players was done
through a computer terminal.38
We decided to use a one-shot game because the analysis of how people learn in highly repetitive
situations (learning in games) was not the focus of this study. We were interested in the predictive
power of the theoretical model on the eﬀects of the split-award tort reform in real-world settings
where stationary replications are almost impossible and, therefore, the type of learning studied in
the laboratory under stationary repetitions is not present.39 In addition, psychological research
38This experimental environment did not permit the formation of reputations.
Given that the purpose of the practice games was to facilitate the understanding of the mechanics of the experiment
(game structure, payoﬀs and consequences of the decisions), we made subjects play practice games against a computer
terminal. Subjects were informed that their partner during these practice games was a computer and that they should
not expect that their human partner in the real game would necessarily behave as the computer did and that they
would not necessarily need to behave as the computer did. In this way, the experience to play against a human
partner was a one-shot experience.
39As noted by Camerer (1997) and stressed by Loewenstein, “the situation that participants face in experiments of
this type [resembles] that of the protagonist in the ﬁlm ‘Groundhog Day’, who repeatedly relives the same day until
he ‘gets it right’. Outside of this ﬁctional ﬁlm, how many people are exposed to the situation of repeatedly, and in
close succession, bidding on the same good [?] Stationary replication is simply not a common feature of economic
life” (Loewenstein, p. F28; comments in brackets).
16shows that people’s behavior at the end of a series of stationary repetitions is not necessarily
more representative of their behavior in economic settings than their behavior at the beginning.
“Repetition tends to repress certain types of psychological motives that may play a prominent
role in early-period play [and may be important in real-world settings]” (Loewenstein, p. F29;
c o m m e n t sa d d e di nb r a c k e t s ) .
The participation fee was CA $5.00, and the average game payoﬀ was CA $13.50. At the end
of each experimental session, subjects received their monetary payoﬀs in cash.
5R e s u l t s
In general, our ﬁndings are consistent with the qualitative theoretical predictions of the litigation
stage. Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 summarize the experimental results.40
[INSERT TABLE 2]
The ﬁrst column of Table 2 presents information regarding the eﬀect of the split-award institu-
tion on potential injurer’s level of care. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, the results do not
suggest a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the expenditures on care chosen under the two conditions.41
Given that subjects understood the structure of the payoﬀ tables, the structure of the game, and
the consequences of their choices (i.e., they understood the link between the choice of investment
in care, the probability of an accident and the litigation outcomes),42 this ﬁnding may suggest
40The information presented in these tables correspond to data pooled on defendant’s type.
Given the small number of observations and to avoid the t-test normality assumptions, we used the robust rank-
order test. This non-parametric test was chosen instead of the more commonly used Mann-Whitney test because
the Mann-Whitney test assumes that the samples come from distributions with identical second (dispersion) and
higher-order moments, whereas the robust rank-order test makes no such assumption. In general, this test has the
same power as the Mann-Whitney test (when the assumptions of that test are met); however, this test appears to
approach the normal distribution somewhat faster as the number of observations gets larger (Siegel and Castellan,
1988).
In case of the analysis of the defendant’s proposal, the number of observations was smaller than 13. Then, we
used the small-sample distribution of ` U rather than the normal approximation. In this case, we were constrained
to use only four signiﬁcant levels, .10, .05, .025, and .01, rather than the near-continuum available for the normal
approximation (Fligner and Policello 1981).
Because of the small number of observations, we used the Fisher exact test (instead of the χ
2-test) to perform
the median test of accepted proposals and to evaluate the null hypothesis of independence between experimental
conditions and dispute rates (Siegel and Castellan).
41Given the results on expenditures on care and given that the probability of accidents depends on the level of
expenditures on care chosen, we have not included here the analysis of the probability of accidents.
42The results from the questionnaire ﬁlled out by subjects before the beginning of the game indicated that subjects
understood the structure of the payoﬀ tables, the structure of the game, the consequences of their choices, and the
17an inability of subjects to incorporate the future implications of their decisions in their current
decisions due to their limited computational abilities.43 In addition, the complexity of the deci-
sion on care44 might induce subjects to make decisions about the investment on care by applying
heuristic-based-reasoning.45 Given the random assignment of subjects to conditions, it is expected
that the use of heuristic-based-reasoning was common to both conditions.
The second column of Table 2 reports the ﬁndings on dispute rates conditional on the occurrence
of an accident. Dispute rate was deﬁned as the percentage of total cases that proceed to the stage
of a trial. As predicted by the model, dispute rates were signiﬁcantly reduced by the split-award
institution. In fact, 88 percent of the pairs in the no split-award condition went to trial, but only 31
percent of cases in the split-award condition were resolved at the trial stage, a strongly signiﬁcant
diﬀerence (p = .002). The third column of Table 2 outlines the ﬁndings on total litigation costs
conditional on accident occurrence. We deﬁned total litigation costs as the sum of costs incurred
by each litigant. Our ﬁndings provide strong support for the theoretical prediction of the eﬀect of
the split-award in reducing the total litigations costs. We found that when pairs bargained under
the split-award institution, the total litigation costs were 65 percent lower than those without a
split-award, a signiﬁcant diﬀerence (p = .000).
[INSERT TABLE 3]
links between their decisions.
43Previous experimental tests of game-theoretic models report similar results. Referring to the play of games
by experimental subjects, Camerer and Johnson (2004) state that, “motivated intelligent subjects behave sensibly,
but do not exhibit the extent of strategic reasoning which is commonly assumed when game theory is applied to
understand ... political maneuvering, incentive design, and so forth” (p. 15). Also Camerer (2003) reports that “[his
work with Johnson et al., (2002) indicates that] players in a three round game [do] not look ahead to the second and
third rounds as much as backward induction requires” (p. 197; comments added in brackets).
44Note that the decision on care and the realization of the litigation losses were separated by the random realization
of the accident and the pre-trial bargaining negotiation.
45Findings from cognitive psychology suggest that human subjects present limited computational abilities. When
confronting complex situations, people make use of heuristic reasoning, such as, shortcuts used by individuals to make
decisions. Tversky’s (1972) theory of “elimination by aspects,” for example, states that individuals choose among
alternatives, not only by comparing alternatives in all aspects at once, but rather by the heuristics of comparing
one randomly chosen aspect at a time, eliminating alternatives along the way. Simon (1955, 1987) hypothesizes that
agents perform only limited searches, accepting the ﬁrst satisfactory decision, process coined as “bounded rationality.“
Heuristics are rational in the sense that they appeal to intuition and avoid deliberation cost, but boundedly rational
in the sense that they often lead to biased choices (Conlisk 1996). Applying the ﬁndings from cognitive psychology
to the study of the law, Korobkin (in press) ﬁnds that “diﬃcult decisions ... are resolved by making easier choices ...
Reliance on a heuristic implies neglect of at least some potentially relevant information, and if the heuristic is not
precisely suited to the relevant problem, suboptimal outcomes will result” (p. 3).
18The ﬁrst column of Table 3 shows the plaintiﬀ’s rejection threshold.46 All proposals below this
threshold were always rejected by the plaintiﬀ.47 As predicted by the theory, we found that the
split-award reduced this threshold by 58 percent. The threshold under the split-award was equal to
130 and the threshold under the no-split award was equal to 310. This eﬀect may suggest strategic
behavior of plaintiﬀs in forming their rejection decision. If plaintiﬀs were strategic, they would
form their rejection decision on the basis of the payoﬀ at trial. Given that the payoﬀ at trial in
case of confronting a negligent defendant is reduced by the split-award, they would reduce their
rejection threshold under the split-award institution.48 The strategic behavior of plaintiﬀs is also
suggested by the median accepted proposal under both conditions. In fact, the median accepted
proposal under the split-award was 53 percent lower than the median accepted proposal under the
no split-award condition, a signiﬁcant diﬀerence (p = .055).49
The second column of Table 3 provides information about the defendant’s mean proposals under
the two institutions.50 The ﬁndings provide some support for the theoretical predictions about the
eﬀect of the split-award in reducing the defendant’s mean proposal. In fact, the defendant’s mean
proposal under the split-award was 22 percent lower than the one without a split-award (but not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, p>. 10).51
[INSERT TABLE 4]
The ﬁrst column of Table 4 provides information about the defendant’s expected total litigation
46The analysis in this table refers to positive proposals from the defendant (i.e., proposals greater than 0).
47In condition 1, all proposals greater than or equal to the rejection threshold were always accepted by the plaintiﬀ
except for the proposal equal to 200 that was proposed by four defendants and rejected by one plaintiﬀ; in condition
2, all proposals greater than or equal to the rejection threshold were always accepted by the plaintiﬀ.
48Note that in equilibrium, the plaintiﬀ should expect that only negligent defendants make a positive proposal.
49The median accepted proposals were equal to 167 and 357.5 for the split-award and no split-award conditions,
respectively. The p value corresponds to the Fisher exact probability for a Median test.
50The data correspond to cases where the defendant made a positive proposal (i.e., proposals greater than zero).
51Note that the proposals were located in the intervals [101,250] and [101,405] for the split-award and the no
split-award conditions respectively.
Note also that 33 percent of the defendants in both conditions chose a proposal equal to 200 (i.e., equal to the
plaintiﬀ’s loss due to an accident). This might suggest that the 200 worked as a focal point for some non-strategic
defendants. However, given that 50 percent of oﬀers made in condition 1 were lower than or equal to 150 and 33
percent of oﬀers made in condition 2 were greater than 200, we still observe strategic behavior in some defendants.
The analysis of the plaintiﬀs’ responses to oﬀers equal to 200 suggests that strategic behavior prevailed over other
considerations in plaintiﬀs’ behavior. In fact, 75 percent of oﬀers equal to 200 were accepted in condition 1, while
no oﬀer equal to 200 was accepted in condition 2. The dispute rates under both conditions, without considering the
oﬀers equal to 200, are also signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (Fisher exact p = .026).
19loss. We deﬁned the defendant’s total litigation loss as the accepted proposal that is transferred
from the defendant to the plaintiﬀ in case of an out-of-court settlement or as the deduction from
the defendant’s payoﬀ imposed by the court in case of trial plus the defendant’s litigation costs.
We found a positive and strongly signiﬁcant eﬀect (p = .000) of the split-award in reducing the
defendant’s expected total litigation loss. This eﬀect can be explained by the lower probability of
trial and the lower plaintiﬀ’s rejection threshold (and therefore, the lower out-of-court transfers
on average) under the split-award institution.52 The second column of Table 4 summarizes the
results about the plaintiﬀ’s expected net compensation (net of litigation cost). We also found that
the split-award reduced signiﬁcantly (p = .000) the plaintiﬀ’s net compensation. This result is
obviously related to the reduction of plaintiﬀ’s rejection threshold (and lower out-of-court transfers
on average) and to the lower plaintiﬀ’s payoﬀ at trial (in case of confronting a negligent defendant)
under the split-award institution.
In the next step we will contrast the quantitative predictions of the model and the experimental
results. Table 5 summarizes the quantitative theoretical predictions and the experimental results.
[INSERT TABLE 5]
Under both institutions, the predicted values from the theory overestimate the empirical results
for the plaintiﬀ’s rejection threshold and underestimate the empirical results for the expenditures
on care, dispute rate (and total litigation costs), defendant’s litigation loss and plaintiﬀ’s net
compensation. This might suggest that the experimental subjects did not satisfy the assumptions
of the model as well as the existence of non-modeled factors that aﬀect subjects’ decisions.
For instance, the patterns of the levels of care that defendants followed in the ﬁrst stage of the
game (under both conditions) and the comparison of these levels of care to the predicted values
suggest risk-averse attitudes. More risk-averse subjects prefer to spend reasonably more (24 instead
of 7 tokens, but not 390 tokens) on care in order to reduce the likelihood of an accident. In fact,
the mean expenditure on care under the split-award was 38.47, a value higher than the predicted
value (equal to 6.40), with 94 percent of these defendants spending more than the predicted value.
52The mean accepted proposals are equal to 175.78 and 357.5, under the split-award and no split-award conditions,
respectively.
20Similarly, under the no split-award condition, the mean expenditure on care chosen by the defen-
dants was 52 percent higher than the predicted value (equal to 24.60), with 50 percent of these
defendants spending more than the predicted value.
Anomalous plaintiﬀ’s behavior (under both conditions) may be also a result of non-neutral
attitudes toward risk. Since the theoretical model assumes risk neutral players, the risk aversion
may explain why observed plaintiﬀ’s rejection thresholds under both conditions are more than 13
percent lower than those stated by the theory. More risk-averse plaintiﬀs prefer to accept a low
settlement oﬀer in order to avoid the risk of not receiving any award in court when confronting a
careful defendant. In addition, the observed dispute rates (higher than the predicted rates under
both conditions) may suggest that there are other non-modeled factors, such as decision errors that
contribute to impasse, besides asymmetric information.
Finally, we will analyze the observed behavior of players in more detail and contrast it with
the predictions about the equilibrium strategies. In general, these predictions are inconsistent with
the experimental observations. For instance, when bargaining is performed under the split-award
institution, the model predicts that there will be an equilibrium with out-of court settlement for
cases where proposals are equal to 150. The results show, however, that the proposal for cases that
settle out-of-court are located in the interval [130,250] and the mean accepted proposal is 175.78. In
fact, only 22 percent of the cases that settled out-of-court had proposals equal to the level predicted
by the theory, and 33 percent of those cases were located within 15 units of the prediction (i.e.,
in the interval [135,165]). The model also predicts that only the negligent defendant will make an
out-of-court settlement oﬀer and that this oﬀer will be equal to 150. However, we observed that
8 percent of defendants who made settlement oﬀers were careful, that the settlement oﬀers were
located in the interval [101,250], and only 18 percent of negligent defendants made an oﬀer equal
to 150.53
When bargaining is performed under the no split-award institution, the theory predicts an
equilibrium with out-of-court settlement where the defendant’s proposal is equal to 400. The
empirical results show, however, that the accepted oﬀers are located in the interval [310,405] and
53A l lp r o p o s a l se q u a lto1 5 0w e r ea c c e p te d .
21that the mean accepted proposal is 357.5. In addition, according to the theoretical predictions, we
should observe that only the negligent defendant makes an out-of-court settlement proposal equal
to 400. However, we found that 8 percent of defendants who made settlement oﬀers were careful,
settlement oﬀers were located in the interval [101,405], and no defendant made an oﬀer equal to
400.
We can inquire now about the reliability of the theoretical model in helping us to understand
the patterns of data. Our results indicate that the qualitative predictions of the model about
the eﬀect of the split-award on litigation outcomes are consistent with the observed behavior and
outcomes. Therefore, the theoretical model contributes signiﬁcantly to the understanding of the
inﬂuence of the split-award institution on litigation outcomes. The signiﬁcant qualitative eﬀect
that the split-award institution had on the observed litigation behavior provides some evidence of
strategic behavior on the part of the subjects.
6 Conclusions
This study reports several important ﬁndings. In the experiment, the split-award institution af-
fected the likelihood of disputes as predicted by the theoretical model. The dispute rate and total
litigation costs were signiﬁcantly lower under the split-award compared to the no split-award case.
Defendants’ litigation losses and plaintiﬀs’ net compensation were positively and signiﬁcantly in-
ﬂuenced by the split-award institution. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, the experimental
results do not suggest a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the expenditures on care chosen under the two
conditions. The signiﬁcant qualitative eﬀect that the split-award institution had on the observed
litigation behavior suggests strategic behavior of the subjects. The examination of the subjects’
decisions also suggests risk-aversion.
Our ﬁndings provide useful information that can be used to improve game theoretic models of
litigation. Directions for future theoretical research include enhancements to the current models to
explain the discrepancies we found, perhaps by incorporating non-neutral attitudes toward risk in
models of incomplete information and adding some relevant behavioral characteristics of subjects
(i.e., the use of heuristics under limited computational abilities) that inﬂuence decisions. Our ﬁnd-
22ings stress the importance of combining experimental and behavioral observation with theoretical
modeling.
Our study shares a weakness in terms of external validity that is common to all laboratory
experimental research. Although our experiment cannot predict the eﬀects of the split-award
institution on levels of care and settlement in richer environments, this experiment provides a
reasonable amount of evidence regarding whether the addition of the split-award institution into
the bargaining process we have structured here will have the predicted eﬀects.
Acknowledgements
We acknowledge research support from Carnegie Mellon University (internal research funds) and
the University of Alberta (Endowment Fund for the Future and Support for the Advancement
of Scholarship grants). C.M. Landeo also acknowledges research funding from the University of
Pittsburgh (Andrew W. Mellon Pre-Doctoral Fellowship, 2001-2002). We are grateful for the
insightful comments and suggestions from two anonymous referees and the editor of this Journal.
We wish to thank Alessandra Cassar, John Duﬀy, Glenn Harrison, Jack Ochs, Greg Pogarsky,
and conference participants at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the Canadian Law and Economics
Association, the 2004 Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, the 2004 Annual Meeting of
the American Economic Association and the 2003 North American Meeting of the Economic Science
Association for their comments. We also thank Lei Lai for programming the software used in this
study. The usual qualiﬁer applies.
23Appendix A. Model Solution
The solutions of the litigation stage54 and of the optimization problem of the defendant follow.
Solution of the Litigation Stage
We focus our analysis on the unique empirically relevant equilibrium of the litigation stage under
conditions qfA− KP > 0a n dfA− KP >K D, that survives Banks and Sobel universal divinity
reﬁnement:55 a partially separating equilibrium in which some cases are dropped, some proceed to
trial, and others settle before trial.56
Proposition A1 characterizes the equilibrium of the litigation stage.
Proposition A1. Assume that qfA−KP > 0a n dfA−KP >K D. The following litigation strategy
proﬁle, together with the plaintiﬀ’s beliefs, represents the equilibrium path of the unique universally
divine Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the litigation stage.
Strategy Proﬁle
1) The plaintiﬀ always ﬁles a suit. In response to an oﬀer S1 = 0, the plaintiﬀ rejects the oﬀer
(goes to trial) with probability α =
fA−KP
A+KD and accepts the oﬀer (drops the action) with probability
(1−α)=
A+KD−fA+KP
A+KD ; the plaintiﬀ always accepts the oﬀer S2 = fA−KP (settles out-of-court).
2) The negligent defendant makes no oﬀer (oﬀers S1 = 0) with probability β =
KP(1−q)
q(fA−KP) and
oﬀers S2 = fA− KP with probability (1 − β)=
q(fA−KP)−KP(1−q)
q(fA−KP) . The careful defendant always
makes no oﬀer (oﬀers S1 =0 ) .
Plaintiﬀ’s Beliefs
54The solution of the litigation stage is the same for both Landeo and Nikitin’s (2005) model and for the simpliﬁed
version presented in this paper. The proof of existence and uniqueness of the litigation stage are the same as the
original model proofs. The proofs related to the optimization problem of the defendant and to the qualitative
predictions are diﬀerent from the original model proofs.
55The condition qfA − KP > 0 ensures that plaintiﬀs always ﬁle a suit (necessary condition) and the condition
fA− KP >K D rules out pooling equilibria (suﬃcient condition). Under these conditions, there are other partially
separating equilibria; they are non-empirically relevant (i.e., they do not allow for lawsuits to be dropped) and do
not survive the universal divinity reﬁnement.
56Data from the U.S. Department of Justice indicate that for a sample of the largest 75 counties (1-year period
ending in 1992), 76.5 percent of product liability cases were disposed through agreed settlement and voluntary
dismissal and 3.3 percent were disposed by trial verdict. The other 20.2 percent were disposed as follows: 4.5 percent
by summary judgment, .5 percent by default judgment, 6 percent were dismissed, 2.7 percent by arbitration award,
6.1 percentby t ransfer, and .3 percent by other dispositions (Smith et al., 1995).
24The equilibrium beliefs are as follows. If an accident occurs, the plaintiﬀ believes with probabil-
ity (1−q) that she is confronting a careful defendant and with probability q that she is confronting a
negligent defendant. When the plaintiﬀ receives an oﬀer, she updates her beliefs using Bayes’ rule:
when she receives an oﬀer S1 = 0, she believes with probability
(1−q)
qβ+(1−q) that she is confronting a
careful defendant and with probability
qβ
qβ+(1−q) that she is confronting a negligent defendant; when
the plaintiﬀ receives an oﬀer S2 = fA− KP, she believes with certainty that she is confronting a
negligent defendant.
The oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs are as follows. When the plaintiﬀ receives an oﬀer S
 
such that
0 <S
 
<fA− KP, she believes that this oﬀer was made by a negligent defendant.
The expected payoﬀs for the plaintiﬀ and careful and negligent defendant are VP = qfA−KP,
VDC = −
 
(
fA−KP
A+KD )KD
 
and VDN = −(fA− KP), respectively.
The conditional probabilities of out-of-court settlement (acceptance of an oﬀer S2 = fA−KP),
dropping a lawsuit (acceptance of an oﬀer S1 = 0), and trial (rejection of an oﬀer S1 =0 )a r ea s
follows: the conditional probability of out-of-court settlement q(1 − β)=
qfA−KP
fA−KP , the conditional
probability of dropping the lawsuit (1 − α)[1 − q(1 − β)] =
 
A(1−f)+KD+KP
A+KD
  
fA(1−q)
fA−KP
 
,a n dt h e
conditional probability of trial α[1 − q(1 − β)] =
fA(1−q)
A+KD .
Proof of Proposition 1A. The proof has two main parts. In the ﬁrst part, we prove the existence
of perfect Bayesian equilibria, one of which is the partially separating PBE stated in Proposition
1, under conditions qfA − KP > 0a n dfA− KP >K D, In the second part, we show that the
equilibrium proposed in Proposition 1 is the only partially separating equilibrium that survives the
universal divinity reﬁnement and therefore, is the unique universal divine PBE of the litigation
stage.
Part 1. Existence of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the Litigation Game
Part 1.1. We eliminate the dominated and iteratively dominated strategies for each player.
Rationality suggests that since the plaintiﬀ can get at most fA−KP at trial, the plaintiﬀ should
accept any pretrial oﬀer over fA− KP. That is, any strategy that calls for the plaintiﬀ to reject
25an oﬀer greater than fA− KP is weakly dominated by a strategy in which he accepts the oﬀer.57
Rationality also suggests, given that the plaintiﬀ can drop the case and lose nothing, the plaintiﬀ
should reject any pretrial oﬀer S<0. That is, any strategy that calls for the plaintiﬀ to accept an
oﬀer lower than zero is dominated by a strategy in which he rejects the oﬀer.
Because the plaintiﬀ accepts all oﬀers over fA− KP (maximum payoﬀ at trial), any strategy
in which the defendant oﬀers more than fA− KP when she is negligent is iteratively dominated
by a strategy in which she oﬀers exactly fA−KP. Rationality also tells us that the defendant will
oﬀer no more than KD (loss for a careful defendant at trial) if she is careful. Finally, because the
plaintiﬀ rejects all oﬀers below zero, any strategy in which the defendant oﬀers less than zero is
iteratively dominated by a strategy in which she oﬀers exactly zero. Then, the minimum possible
oﬀer is S = 0 and represents the defendant’s refusal to settle.
Hence, after eliminating the dominated strategies and a ﬁrst round of elimination of the it-
eratively dominated strategies for each player, we can restrict our attention to the oﬀer space
[0,fA− KP] for the negligent defendant (i.e., a proposal cannot be negative or greater than the
maximum payoﬀ the plaintiﬀ can get in court), and to the oﬀer space [0,K D], for the careful defen-
dant (i.e., a proposal cannot be negative or greater than the maximum loss the careful defendant
can get in court).
Let’s apply iterative elimination of dominated strategies again. Because the careful defendant
never oﬀers more than KD and since the plaintiﬀ can get fA− KP at trial, rationality suggests
that the plaintiﬀ should reject any pretrial oﬀer over KD and lower than fA− KP.T h a ti s ,a n y
strategy that calls for the plaintiﬀ to accept such an oﬀer is iteratively dominated by a strategy in
which he rejects the oﬀer. Rationality also tells us that the negligent defendant will not make any
oﬀer greater than KD and lower than fA− KP. Then, the oﬀer space for a negligent defendant
gets reduced to [0,K D]U{fA− KP}.
Part 1.2. We prove that in equilibrium the negligent defendant randomizes at most between
two possible strategies. In Part 1.1. we show that the oﬀer space for the negligent defendant is
57It is only weakly dominated because the second strategy does not result in a strictly higher payoﬀ against every
one of the defendant’s strategies. In particular, it does not result in a strictly higher payoﬀ if the defendant’s strategy
is to refuse to oﬀer a settlement (i.e., oﬀer S = 0) whether negligent or careful.
26given by [0,K D] U {fA−KP}; then it suﬃces to show that there is no more than one equilibrium
oﬀer S1 ∈ [0,K D].58
We consider 3 steps. First, we show that there is no equilibrium oﬀer in this interval that is
proposed by the negligent defendant only. Second, we show that there is no equilibrium oﬀer in the
interval proposed by the careful defendant only. Finally, we show that no two distinct equilibrium
proposals are proposed by both types of defendant.
Part 1.2.1.
If such an equilibrium oﬀer ˜ S existed, the plaintiﬀ would reject it with probability 1. Hence the
case would be resolved at trial, and the negligent defendant would lose A + KD. He is better oﬀ
oﬀering fA− KP, which is accepted with certainty.
Part 1.2.2.
If such an equilibrium oﬀer ˜ S existed, then the plaintiﬀ would accept it with probability 1.
Hence the negligent defendant would be better oﬀ switching to this oﬀer.
Part 1.2.3.
We prove it by contradiction. Assume that there exist two such oﬀers, S1 and S2, such that
0 ≤ S1 <S 2 ≤ KD.De n o t e b y p1 and p2 the respective equilibrium probabilities of acceptance
of these proposals by the plaintiﬀ. Each type of defendant is indiﬀerent between these proposals.
Hence
S1p1 +( 1− p1)KD = S2p2 +( 1− p2)KD (A1)
and
S1p1 +( 1− p1)(A + KD)=S2p2 +( 1− p2)(A + KD). (A2)
Subtracting the ﬁrst equation from the second one, we get
(1 − p1)A =( 1− p2)A. (A3)
58No more than one equilibrium oﬀer S1 ∈ [0,K D] implies that the negligent defendant randomizes at most between
2 possible strategies, one of which is fA− KP.
27Hence, p1 = p2, but in that case defendants of both types are strictly better oﬀ oﬀering S1.
Contradiction follows.
Part 1.3. We show that under conditions qfA − KP > 0a n dfA− KP >K D,t h e r ea r e
inﬁnitely many partially separating equilibria (one of them is the one stated in Proposition 1) and
inﬁnitely many pooling equilibria.59
Part 1.3.1. Existence of Partially Separating Equilibria
The description of the partially separating equilibria is as follows. If qfA − KP > 0a n d
fA− KP >K D, 1) careful defendants oﬀer S1 such that 0 ≤ S1 ≤ KD, and negligent defendants
mix the two strategies, oﬀer S1 such that 0 ≤ S1 ≤ KD with probability ˜ β and oﬀer S2 = fA−KP
with probability (1− ˜ β), and 2) plaintiﬀs always ﬁle a lawsuit; plaintiﬀs always accept S2
60 and mix
between rejection (with probability ˜ α) and acceptance (with probability (1 − ˜ α)) when the oﬀer is
S1 such that 0 <S 1 ≤ KD.61
Consider the expected payoﬀs for the plaintiﬀ, careful and negligent defendants in terms of ˜ α
and ˜ β. The expected payoﬀ for the plaintiﬀ VP is
VP =( 1−q)[˜ α(−KP)+(1− ˜ α)(S1)]+q{˜ β[˜ α(fA−KP)+(1− ˜ α)(S1)]+(1− ˜ β)(fA−KP)}. (A4)
The expected payoﬀ for the careful defendant VDC is
VDC =˜ α(−KD)+( 1− ˜ α)(S1), (A5)
and the expected payoﬀ for the negligent defendant VDN is
VDN = ˜ β[˜ α(−(A + KD)) + (1 − ˜ α)(S1)] + (1 − ˜ β)[−(fA− KP)]. (A6)
59Condition qfA - KP > 0 rules out the equilibrium where no lawsuit is ﬁled, and condition fA − KP >K D
rules out the pooling equilibrium where the careful defendant behaves as a negligent defendant by making a positive
settlement oﬀer.
A separating equilibrium is not possible in this game. Suppose that a separating equilibrium exists: careful
defendants oﬀer S1 ≤ KD and negligentdefendant s oﬀer S2  = S1.G i v e nth a t S1 is always accepted by the plaintiﬀ
and S2 is always rejected by the plaintiﬀ, then the negligent defendant has an incentive to deviate to S1 because
S1 <A+ KD.
60A defendantoﬀering S2 reveals his type, and hence S2 should be equal to fA− KP to be always accepted.
61As the plaintiﬀ accepts some of the oﬀers of S1, a negligent defendant has an incentive to mimic the behavior of
the careful defendant and oﬀer S1 as well.
28The values of ˜ α and ˜ β are calculated from the condition that both parties (the plaintiﬀ and the
negligent defendant) have to be indiﬀerent between their strategies to mix them. Thus,
fA− KP =˜ α(A + KD)+( 1− ˜ α)S1 (A7)
and
S1 =
q˜ β
q˜ β +( 1− q)
(fA− KP)+
1 − q
q˜ β +( 1− q)
(−KP). (A8)
Equation (A4) says that a negligent defendant is indiﬀerent between admitting his negligence
(i.e., oﬀering S2 = fA− KP) and stating that he is careful (i.e., oﬀering S1) with the risk to lose
A+KD if the case goes to court. Equation (A5) says that a plaintiﬀ is indiﬀerent between dropping
the case and getting a payoﬀ of S1 and going to court. Solving (A4) for ˜ α and (A5) for ˜ β we get
˜ α =
fA−KP−S1
A+KD−S1 and ˜ β =
(S1+KP)(1−q)
q(fA−S1−KP).62
Next, the expected payoﬀs for the plaintiﬀ and careful and negligent defendant are VP =
qfA− KP, VDC = −
 
S1[(1−f)A+KP]+(fA−KP)KD
A+KD−S1
 
and VDN = −(fA− KP), respectively.
The equilibrium beliefs are as follows. If an accident occurs, the plaintiﬀ believes with probabil-
ity (1−q) that she is confronting a careful defendant and with probability q that she is confronting
a negligent defendant. When the plaintiﬀ receives an oﬀer, she updates her beliefs using Bayes’
rule: when she receives an oﬀer S1, she believes with probability
(1−q)
q˜ β+(1−q) that she is confronting
a careful defendant and with probability
q˜ β
q˜ β+(1−q) that she is confronting a negligent defendant;
when the plaintiﬀ receives an oﬀer S2, she believes with certainty that she is confronting a negligent
defendant.
The oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs are as follows. When the plaintiﬀ observes an oﬀer S
 
<S 1 or an
oﬀer S1 <S
 
<f A− KP, she believes that she faces a negligent defendant. Then, the plaintiﬀ
rejects the oﬀer with certainty because she will obtain a higher payoﬀ (fA− KP) if she brings the
negligent defendant to trial. Given that S
 
is rejected with certainty, the careful defendant will
not make the oﬀer S
 
because he will receive a higher payoﬀ by oﬀering S1, which is accepted with
positive probability in the proposed equilibrium. Given that the plaintiﬀ will reject the oﬀer S
 
62Note that ˜ α(S1 =0 )=α and ˜ β(S1 =0 )=β; that is, the equilibrium path just described corresponds to the
partially separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium stated in Proposition 1.
29with certainty, the negligent defendant will not make an oﬀer S
 
because he will receive a higher
payoﬀ by oﬀering S2 = fA− KP with probability (1 − ˜ β)a n dS1 with probability ˜ β (as stated in
the proposed equilibrium).
Note also that VP = qfA− KP > 0. Therefore, plaintiﬀs ﬁle a suit with probability one.
Part 1.3.2. Existence of Pooling Equilibria
The description of the pooling equilibria is as follows. If qfA−KP > 0a n dfA−KP >K D,1 )
negligent and careful defendants oﬀer the same amount S,w h e r e0<S≤ KD and S ≥ qfA−KP,
and 2) plaintiﬀs always ﬁle a lawsuit; plaintiﬀs always accept the oﬀer S.63
The equilibrium beliefs are as follows. If an accident occurs, the plaintiﬀ believes with probabil-
ity (1−q) that she is confronting a careful defendant, and with probability q that she is confronting
a negligent defendant. Given that defendants pool, when the plaintiﬀ receives an oﬀer, she cannot
update her beliefs. Then, the plaintiﬀ accepts if the oﬀer is greater than or equal to her ex-ante
expected return from trial (S ≥ qfA − KP).64 The oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs compatible with this
equilibrium are as follows. If the defendant oﬀers ˜ S  = S, then the plaintiﬀ believes with certainty
that he faces the negligent defendant and rejects the oﬀer.
Part 2. Uniqueness of the Litigation Stage Equilibrium
We prove that the PBE stated in Proposition 1 is the only PBE that survives the universal
divinity reﬁnement is the partially separating PBE, and therefore, this is the unique equilibrium
of the litigation stage. We proceed ﬁrst to apply the universal divinity reﬁnement to the partially
separating equilibria, and second, to the pooling equilibria. The implementation of the universal
divinity reﬁnement proceeds as follows. First, we ﬁnd (for careful and negligent defendants) the
minimum probability of acceptance (by the plaintiﬀ) of an oﬀer that diﬀers from the equilibrium
oﬀers (deviation oﬀer) such that the defendant is willing to deviate. Second, we compare these
63if S ≤ KD fails to hold, the careful defendant will ﬁnd it optimal to deviate, to oﬀer 0, and go to trial; if
S ≥ qfA− KP fails to hold, the plaintiﬀ will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate and reject the proposal S.
Note also that there is no possible pooling with S = 0 and plaintiﬀ accepting the oﬀer with certainty; if every
defendantoﬀers S = 0, then the plaintiﬀ will be better oﬀ by rejecting the oﬀer because qfA − KP > 0 (i.e., her
ex-ante expected payoﬀ from going to trial is greater than the oﬀer). Then, it would be optimal for the negligent
defendant to deviate from oﬀering S =0to S

= fA− KP <A+ KD (loss att rial).
64The plaintiﬀ computes the ex-ante return from trial by using her prior beliefs and the payoﬀs at trial from
confronting negligent and careful defendants, so the ex-ante return from trial q(fA−KP)+(1−q)(−KP)=qfA−KP.
30minimum probabilities. The defendant with the lower minimum probability will be the one the
plaintiﬀ should expect (with probability one) to deviate.
Part 2.1. Elimination of the Other Partially Separating Equilibria
Consider the deviation S
 
from an equilibrium oﬀer S1 or S2. We will cover the analysis of three
cases: 0 ≤ S
 
<K D, S
 
= KD and KD <S
 
<fA− KP.
Case I: 0 ≤ S
 
<K D
For mathematical convenience, deﬁne S
 
= S1 −  .I f <0, then the deviation oﬀer S
 
>S 1
and if  >0, then the deviation oﬀer S
 
<S 1.
Proceed ﬁrst to analyze the case of the negligent defendant. The negligent defendant will be
willing to deviate if
pN(S1 −  )+( 1− pN)(A + KD) ≤ (fA− KP), (A9)
where the left-hand side of the inequality represents the expected loss for the negligent defendant
from deviating and the right-hand side represents his expected loss in equilibrium.65 Solving for
pN we get
pN ≥
(1 − f)A + KP + KD
A + KD − S1 +  
, (A10)
then the minimum probability of acceptance of the deviation oﬀer made by the negligent defendant
is
pN =
(1 − f)A + KP + KD
A + KD − S1 +  
. (A11)
Now ﬁnd the minimum probability of acceptance of the deviation by the plaintiﬀ, such that the
careful defendant is still willing to propose it:
pC(S1 −  )+( 1− pC)KD ≤
 
S1(1 −
fA− KP − S1
A + KD − S1
)+KD
fA− KP − S1
A + KD − S1
 
, (A12)
65Note that in every partially separating PBE of the litigation game (under the conditions qfA − KP > 0a n d
fA− KP >K D) the expected payoﬀ for the negligent defendant is fA− KP.
31where the left-hand side of the inequality represents the expected loss for the careful defendant
from deviating and the right-hand side represents his expected loss in equilibrium.66 Solving for
pC we get
pC ≥
[(1 − f)A + KD + KP](KD − S1)
(A + KD − S1)(KD − S1 +  )
, (A13)
then the minimum probability of acceptance of the deviation oﬀer made by the careful defendant
is
pC =
[(1 − f)A + KD + KP](KD − S1)
(A + KD − S1)(KD − S1 +  )
. (A14)
Compare the threshold probabilities for the negligent and careful defendant:
pC−pN =[ ( 1 −f)A+KD+KP]
 
(KD − S1)(A + KD − S1 +  ) − (A + KD − S1)(KD − S1 +  )
(A + KD − S1)(KD − S1 +  )(A + KD − S1 +  )
 
=
=
−A [(1 − f)A + KD + KP]
(A + KD − S1)(KD − S1 +  )(A + KD − S1 +  )
, (A15)
where the expressions in bracket and parentheses are positive. Then, if  <0, pN <p C,a n di f
 >0, pN >p C.
Following the universal divinity reﬁnement, if 0 ≤ S
 
<K D and  <0( S
 
>S 1), the plaintiﬀ
should believe that the deviation S
 
comes from a negligent defendant with probability one. On the
other hand, if  >0( S
 
<S 1), the plaintiﬀ should believe with probability one that the deviation
S
 
comes from a careful defendant.
Apply the universal divinity reﬁnement to the other partially separating equilibria (where 0 <
S1 ≤ KD). The oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs imply that the plaintiﬀ should infer that any deviation S
 
comes from a negligent defendant. In case of  >0( S
 
<S 1), these oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs do
not survive the reﬁnement. The plaintiﬀ should believe that the deviation comes from a careful
defendant and accept the oﬀer. This response from the plaintiﬀ will generate an incentive for the
negligent defendant to deviate and oﬀer S1 −  . Hence, the other partially separating equilibria
(where 0 <S 1 ≤ KD) do not pass the test of universal divinity for 0 ≤ S
 
<K D.
66Remember that ˜ α(S1 =0 )=α. Given that we need to apply the results of this proof to check all partially
separating PBE of the litigation game, we will use ˜ α in the computation of the expected payoﬀ for the careful
defendant. Note that in every partially separating PBE of the litigation game (under the conditions qfA − KP > 0
and fA− KP >K D), the expected payoﬀ for the careful defendant does depend on S1.
32We will apply now the universal divinity reﬁnement to the empirically relevant equilibrium
(where S1 = 0). The oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs imply that the plaintiﬀ should infer that any deviation
comes from a negligent defendant. Note also that given that S1 = 0 is the lowest possible oﬀer,
only deviations above S1 (i.e., S
 
>S 1) are possible. Therefore, the oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs survive
the universal divinity reﬁnement. Hence, the empirically relevant equilibrium passes the test of
universal divinity for 0 ≤ S
 
<K D.
Case II: S
 
= KD
The minimum probability of acceptance of a deviation oﬀer made by the negligent defendant is
still given by equation (A8).
For the case of the careful defendant, note that his expected deviation loss is KD and his
expected equilibrium loss is in the interval (
fA−KP
A+KD ,K D)( f o r0<S 1 <K D) and is equal to
fA−KP
A+KD <K D (for S1 = 0). Then, for any probability of acceptance, the careful defendant will not
be willing to deviate when S
 
= KD.
By universal divinity, the plaintiﬀ should expect that any deviation oﬀer S
 
= KD comes from
a negligent defendant. Thus, all partially separating PBE pass the test of universal divinity for
S
 
= KD.
Given that the partially separating PBE stated in Proposition 1 is the only partially separating
equilibrium that survives the universal divinity reﬁnement in both cases, then the equilibrium
proposed in Proposition 1 is the only universal divine partially separating PBE.
Part 2.2. Elimination of the Pooling Equilibria
Consider the deviation S
 
from an equilibrium oﬀer S. We will cover the analysis of two cases:
0 ≤ S
 
<K D and S
 
= KD.
Case I: 0 ≤ S
 
<K D
For mathematical convenience, deﬁne S
 
= S − .I f <0, then the deviation oﬀer S
 
>S ,a n d
if  >0, then the deviation oﬀer S
 
<S .
Proceed ﬁrst to analyze the case of the negligent defendant, who will be willing to deviate if
pN(S −  )+( 1− pN)(A + KD) ≤ S, (A16)
33where the left-hand side of the inequality represents the expected loss for the negligent defendant
from deviating and the right-hand side represents his expected loss in equilibrium.67 Solving for
pN we get
pN ≥
A + KD − S
A + KD − S +  
. (A17)
Then, the minimum probability of acceptance of the deviation oﬀer made by the negligent defendant
is
pN =
A + KD − S
A + KD − S +  
. (A18)
Now ﬁnd the minimum probability of acceptance of the deviation by the plaintiﬀ, such that the
careful defendant is still willing to propose it:
pC(S −  )+( 1− pC)KD ≤ S, (A19)
where the left-hand side of the inequality represents the expected loss for the careful defendant
from deviating and the right-hand side represents his expected loss in equilibrium. Solving for pC
we get
pC ≥
KD − S
KD − S +  
, (A20)
then, the minimum probability of acceptance of the deviation oﬀer made by the careful defendant
is
pC =
KD − S
KD − S +  
. (A21)
Note that inspection of equations (A21) and (A18) show that if  <0, the left-hand side of the
inequalities will be greater than 1. Given that the right-hand side of the inequalities correspond
to probabilities (which cannot be greater than 1), the inspection of these equations permits us to
conclude that the universal divinity reﬁnement is not applicable for cases where  <0, then we will
proceed to the application of the universal divinity reﬁnement only in cases where  >0.
Compare the threshold probabilities for the negligent and careful defendant:
pC − pN =
−A 
(KD − S +  )(A + KD − S +  )
, (A22)
67Note that in every pooling PBE of the litigation game (under the conditions qfA−KP > 0a n dfA−KP >K D),
the expected payoﬀ for the negligent defendant is S.
34where A and the expressions in parentheses are positive. Then, if  >0, pN >p C.
Following the universally divinity reﬁnement, if 0 ≤ S
 
<K D and  >0( S
 
<S ), the plaintiﬀ
should believe with probability one that the deviation S
 
comes from a careful defendant.
Apply the universal divinity reﬁnement to the pooling equilibria (where 0 <S≤ KD). The oﬀ-
equilibrium beliefs imply that the plaintiﬀ should infer that any deviation S
 
comes from a negligent
defendant. These oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs do not survive the reﬁnement. The plaintiﬀ should believe
that the deviation comes from a careful defendant and accept the oﬀer. This response from the
plaintiﬀ will generate an incentive for the negligent defendant to deviate and oﬀer S− . Hence, the
pooling equilibria (where 0 <S≤ KD) do not pass the test of universal divinity for 0 ≤ S
 
<K D.
Case II: S
 
= KD
The minimum probability of acceptance of a deviation oﬀer made by the negligent defendant is
still given by equation (A11).
For the case of the careful defendant, note that his expected deviation loss is KD and his
expected equilibrium loss is in the interval (
fA−KP
A+KD ,K D)( f o r0<S<K D) and is equal to
fA−KP
A+KD <
KD (for S = 0). Then, for any probability of acceptance, the careful defendant will not be willing
to deviate when S
 
= KD.
By universal divinity, the plaintiﬀ should expect that any deviation oﬀer S
 
= KD comes from
a negligent defendant. Thus, all pooling PBE pass the test of universal divinity for S
 
= KD.
Given that no pooling PBE survive the universal divinity reﬁnement in both cases, there is no
universal divine pooling PBE.
Hence, the partially separating PBE stated in Proposition 1 is the unique universally divine
PBE of the litigation stage. Q.E.D.
Optimization Problem of the Defendant
The optimization problem of a defendant type i is to choose the level of care that minimizes his
total expected loss Li = ci(y)+λ(y)l,w h e r el is the expected loss from legal action, diﬀerent for
35careful and negligent defendants.68 Then, Li is deﬁned as

 
 
ci(y)+λ(y)(fA− KP)i fy<¯ y
ci(y)+λ(y)
fA−KP
A+KD KD if y ≥ ¯ y.
(A23)
The total expected loss Li (for a given i) is then a discontinuous function of y, with discontinuity
at the point y =¯ y. L follows the function ci(y)+λ(y)(fA− KP) until the point of discontinuity;
after this point, L follows the function ci(y)+λ(y)
fA−KP
A+KD KD.G i v e nt h a tfA−KP >
(fA−KP)KD
A+KD ,
the function L shifts down discontinuously at the point y =¯ y.
In order to guarantee the existence of an interior solution to the defendant’s optimization
problem, we assume that λ (y) < 0 (the probability of accident is a decreasing function of the level
of care), λ  (y) > 0 (expenditures on accident prevention exhibit diminishing marginal returns),
limy→+∞ λ(y) = 0 (inﬁnitely high level of care makes the probability of accident inﬁnitely small),
and λ(0) = 1. In addition, we assume that c1(y) >c 2(y) (the potential injurers of type 2 are
more eﬃcient and need to spend less to achieve a given level of care than the potential injurers of
type 1) and that ci
y(y) > 0 (higher levels of care require larger expenditures on safety). We also
assume that ci
yy(y) > 0 (the marginal cost of care increases with the degree of care, i.e., ci
y(y)i s
increasing in y)a n dt h a tc1
y(y) >c 2
y(y) (the marginal cost of care is greater for injurers of lower
skill). For both functions c(.)a n dλ(.), we assume that their ﬁrst and second partial derivatives are
continuous functions. The ﬁnal technical assumption is that limy→+0 λ (y)
(fA−KP)KD
A+KD + ci
y(y) < 0
for any i. It is easy to show that under these assumptions the function L = ci(y)+λ(y)l is convex
and U-shaped for any i and any l ≥
(fA−KP)KD
A+KD . Therefore, it has a single interior minimum.69
Lemmas A1 and A2 show that the value of y that minimizes the total expected loss function for
a negligent defendant of a given type is higher than the value of y that minimizes the total expected
loss function for a careful defendant of the same type. Therefore the combined loss function can
68Note that the values of l for the negligent and careful defendant are equal to -VDN and -VDC respectively.
69Assumptions λ
  (y) > 0a n dc
i
yy(y) > 0 guarantee that the function L is convex. Furthermore, given that
limy→+0 λ
 (y)
(fA−KP )KD
A+KD + c
i
y(y) < 0, then limy→+0 L
  < 0f o rb o th l =
(fA−KP )KD
A+KD and l = fA− KP. Therefore
the function L is decreasing for suﬃciently small values of y. On the other hand, given that limy→+∞ λ(y)=0 ,th e
term λ(y)l vanishes in the limit, and for suﬃciently large values of y, the function L is increasing in y justbecause
c(y)i si n c r e a s i n gi ny.
36have at most one interior local minimum.70
Lemma A1. For any i and any positive value of l,t h ev a l u eo fy that minimizes the function
ci(y)+λ(y)l is increasing in l.
Proof. Given the assumptions about the functions ci(y)a n dλ(y), the function ci(y)+λ(y)l is
convex, and it has a single minimum point that is characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition,
ci
y(y)+λ (y)l =0 . (A24)
Totally diﬀerentiating this ﬁrst-order condition yields
[ci
yy(y)+λ  (y)l]dy = −λ (y)dl. (A25)
The last equation can be rewritten as
∂y
∂l
=
−λ (y)
ci
yy(y)+λ  (y)l
> 0. (A26)
This inequality holds because both second derivatives, ci
yy(y)a n dλ  (y), are positive, λ (y) < 0,
and l ≥
(fA−KP)KD
A+KD > 0 by assumption. Q.E.D.
Lemma A2. For all i,t h ev a l u eo fy that minimizes the function ci(y)+λ(y)(fA− KP) is larger
than the value of y that minimizes the function ci(y)+λ(y)
(fA−KP)KD
A+KD .
Proof.
(fA−KP)KD
A+KD <fA− KP. Hence the lemma is a direct application of Lemma A1. Q.E.D.
Note that the total expected loss function is diﬀerent for each type i. Lemma A3 veriﬁes that
the minimum of the function ci(y)+λ(y)l is greater for the eﬃcient (type 2) potential injurer than
for the ineﬃcient injurer. Hence a type-2 potential injurer is more likely to meet the due care
standard than a type-1 potential injurer.
Lemma A3. For any positive l,a r gm i n{(c1(y)+λ(y)l)} < arg min {c2(y)+λ(y)l)}.
70If the value of y that minimizes the total expected loss for the careful defendant were larger than the value of
y that minimizes the expected loss for the negligent defendant, it would be possible that the combined loss function
had two interior minima, one greater than ¯ y (in the careful range) and one smaller than ¯ y (in the negligent range).
37Proof. Assume the contrary and seek for a contradiction. Let ˆ y1 ≡ argmin{(c1(y)+λ(y)l)}≥
argmin{(c2(y)+λ(y)l)}≡ˆ y2. Then, we can write the ﬁrst-order conditions of optimization for
both types as
c1
y(ˆ y1)+λ (ˆ y1)l =0 ( A27)
and
c2
y(ˆ y2)+λ (ˆ y2)l =0 . (A28)
Combining these ﬁrst-order conditions, we get
c1
y(ˆ y1) − c2
y(ˆ y2)=( λ (ˆ y2) − λ (ˆ y1))l. (A29)
By assumption ˆ y1 ≥ ˆ y2 and hence, c1
y(ˆ y1) ≥ c1
y(ˆ y2) >c 2
y(ˆ y2). Therefore the left-hand side of
equation (A7) is positive. On the other hand, ˆ y1 ≥ ˆ y2 implies λ (ˆ y1) ≥ λ (ˆ y2)b e c a u s eλ (y)i s
increasing in y. Therefore, the right-hand side of equation (A7) is non-positive. Contradiction
follows. Q.E.D.
We are interested in an equilibrium in which type-1 potential injurers choose to be negligent
and type-2 potential injurers are careful. Only in that case, plaintiﬀs face asymmetric information,
and the empirically relevant equilibrium of the litigation game takes place. Proposition 2 describes
conditions for this equilibrium.
Deﬁne y1
N ≡ arg min{c1(y)+λ(y)(fA− KP)} and y2
N ≡ arg min{c2(y)+λ(y)(fA− KP)}.I n
words, y1
N is the interior minimum of the “negligent” part of the total loss function of a type-1
potential injurer, and y2
N is the interior minimum of the “negligent” part of the total loss function
of a type-2 potential injurer.
Proposition A2. Type-1 potential injurers choose to be negligent if y1
N < ¯ y and c1(y1
N)+λ(y1
N)(fA−
KP) <c 1(¯ y)+λ(¯ y)
(fA−KP)KD
A+KD , and type-2 potential injurers choose to be careful if y2
N ≥ ¯ y or
c2(y2
N)+λ(y2
N)(fA− KP) ≥ c2(¯ y)+λ(¯ y)
(fA−KP)KD
A+KD .
Proof. Deﬁne L1
N(y) ≡ c1(y)+λ(y)(fA− KP), L2
N(y) ≡ c2(y)+λ(y)(fA− KP), L1
C(y) ≡ c1(y)+
λ(y)
(fA−KP)KD
A+KD ,a n dL2
C(y) ≡ c2(y)+λ(y)
(fA−KP)KD
A+KD .
38Type-1 potential injurers choose to be negligent only if y1
N < ¯ y. Otherwise (i.e., if y1
N ≥ ¯ y),
then L1
C(y1
N) <L 1
N(y1
N), and the type-1 potential injurers prefer to be careful.
By Lemma A2, y1
N > argmin{c1(y)+λ(y)
(fA−KP)KD
A+KD }, and hence the “careful” part of the total
loss function is strictly increasing for y ≥ ¯ y. Therefore, L1
N(y1
N) <L 1
C(¯ y) is the other necessary
condition under which the type-1 potential injurers choose to be negligent. L1
N(y1
N) <L 1
C(¯ y)c a n
be rewritten as
c1(y1
N)+λ(y1
N)(fA− KP) <c 1(¯ y)+λ(¯ y)
(fA− KP)KD
A + KD
. (A30)
The condition
y2
N ≥ ¯ y or c2(y2
N)+λ(y2
N)(fA− KP) ≥ c2(¯ y)+λ(¯ y)
(fA− KP)KD
A + KD
(A31)
is the complement of the condition
y1
N < ¯ y and c1(y1
N)+λ(y1
N)(fA− KP) <c 1(¯ y)+λ(¯ y)
(fA− KP)KD
A + KD
, (A32)
written for the type-2 potential injurers. These potential injurers certainly prefer to be careful, if
y2
N ≥ ¯ y, and therefore, c2(y2
N)+λ(y2
N)
(fA−KP)KD
A+KD <c 2(y2
N)+λ(y2
N)(fA− KP). Hence y2
N ≥ ¯ y
is a suﬃcient condition for type 2 agents to be careful. However, it is not necessary. Even if
y2
N < ¯ y, but L2
C(¯ y) ≤ L2
N(y2
N), type-2 potential injurers choose to meet the standard. The condition
L2
C(¯ y) ≤ L2
N(y2
N) can be rewritten as
c2(y2
N)+λ(y2
N)(fA− KP) ≥ c2(¯ y)+λ(¯ y)
(fA− KP)KD
A + KD
. (A33)
Q.E.D.
Using the previous results, we can now derive the unconditional probabilities of trial, out-of-
court settlement and dropping the case. Deﬁne y1 and y2 as the optimal levels of care chosen
by type-1 and type-2 potential injurers, respectively. Note that the probability of an accident is
µ = φλ(y1)+( 1− φ)λ(y2), and the probability of an accident involving a careful defendant is
µc =( 1− φ)λ(y2). Note also that given that the probability of an accident involving a careful
defendant is µc and (1 − q) is the probability that a defendant has been careful conditional on the
occurrence of an accident, then by Bayes’ rule, (1 − q)=µc/µ and q =1− µc/µ.
39Given that the probability of trial conditional on the occurrence of an accident is
fA(1−q)
A+KD ,t h e n
the unconditional probability of trial is
fA(1−q)
A+KD µ =
fA
A+KDµc. Similarly, given that the probability of
out-of-court settlement conditional on occurrence of the accident is
qfA−KP
fA−KP , then the unconditional
probability of out-of-court settlement is µ − (
fA
fA−KP )µc. Finally, given that the probability of
dropping a case conditional on the occurrence of an accident is
 
A(1−f)+KD+KP
A+KD
  
fA(1−q)
fA−KP
 
,t h e n
the unconditional probability of dropping a case is
 
A(1−f)+KD+KP
A+KD
  
(
fA
fA−KP )µc
 
.
40Appendix B. Proofs of Propositions in the Main Text
Proofs of Propositions 1–5 follow.71
Proof of Proposition 1. We will prove the claim that a decrease in f decreases the level of care, if
the optimal level of care diﬀers from the care standard ¯ y, and therefore, it reduces the aggregate
level of care.
Consider the case when the potential injurer is negligent. Evaluating (A2) at l = fA− KP for
i = 1 and totally diﬀerentiating it yields
c1
yy(y1
N)dy + λ  (y1
N)[fA− KP]dy + λ (y1
N)Adf =0 . (B1)
Rearranging terms,
∂y
∂f
= −
Aλ (y1
N)
c1
yy(y1
N)+λ  (y1
N)[fA− KP]
> 0. (B2)
The case when the potential injurer is careful can be proven in exactly the same way. If the
type-2 potential injurers just meet the standard (i.e., if type-2 ﬁrms are just high-eﬃciency type
ﬁrms), then a marginal change in f has no impact on their level of care, which remains equal to ¯ y.
Therefore, the aggregate level of care, φy1 +( 1− φ)y2, decreases unambiguously. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Given that the probability of an accident is µ = φλ(y1)+( 1− φ)λ(y2), we
have
∂µ
∂f = φλ (y1)
∂y1
∂f +( 1− φ)λ (y2)
∂y2
∂f > 0 because λ (y) < 0 for any y by assumption,
∂y1
∂f < 0
(Proposition 1) and
∂y2
∂f ≤ 0 (Proposition 1). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. The unconditional probability of trial is equal to
fA
A+KDµc. The ﬁrst term,
fA
A+KD, depends positively on f. The second term is equal to
µc =( 1− φ)λ(y2). (B3)
If the condition of the Proposition is satisﬁed, y2 =¯ y and is independent of f. Hence, a reduction
in f decreases µc as well as the unconditional probability of trial.
71We assume that a change in f is small enough to preserve the conditions qfA − KP > 0a n dfA− KP >K D.
41The conditional probability of trial equals
fA
A+KDµc
1
µ,w h e r eµ, the unconditional probability of
an accident, negatively depends on f (Proposition 2). Hence, the conditional probability of trial
negatively depends on f as well. Q.E.D.
It is important to note, however, that the condition y2 =¯ y is a suﬃcient but not necessary
condition for the results of Proposition 3 to hold. Even if type-2 potential injurers choose an interior
solution and µc rises following an a reduction in f, a reduction in the ﬁrst term,
fA
(A+KD) can fully
oﬀset the previous eﬀect.
Proof of Proposition 4. When confronting a negligent defendant, the plaintiﬀ’s payoﬀ at trial is
equal to fA− KP. Then, the rational plaintiﬀ will accept all (positive) out-of-court proposals
S ≥ fA− KP. In addition, the plaintiﬀ’s oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs, which support the unique PBE,
are as follows: when observing an oﬀer S
 
such that O<S
 
<fA−KP, the plaintiﬀ believes that
the oﬀer comes from a negligent defendant and rejects the oﬀer. Therefore, the plaintiﬀ’s rejection
threshold is equal to fA−KP, and this is also the equilibrium (positive) oﬀer made by a negligent
defendant. Note that
∂(fA− KP)
∂f
= A>0, (B4)
so a reduction in f will reduce the plaintiﬀ’s rejection threshold and the negligent defendant’s
equilibrium (positive) proposal. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. The negligent defendant’s expected loss from legal action is equal to
(fA− KP), and the careful defendant’s expected loss from legal action is equal to
(fA−KP)
A+KD KD.
Note that
∂(fA− KP)
∂f
= A>0, (B5)
and
∂
 
(fA−KP)
A+KD KD
 
∂f
=
AKD
A + KD
> 0, (B6)
so a reduction in f will reduce the expected loss from legal action for both the careful and the
negligent defendants. Q.E.D.
42Appendix C. Welfare Analysis
The welfare analysis of the split-award tort reform follows:
Deﬁne the social cost of accidents, CS, as follows.
CS =[ φc1(y,n1)+( 1− φ)c2(y,n2)] + µ
 
H +
fA(1 − q)
A + KD
(KD + KP)
 
, (C1)
where φ represents the share of the low-skill potential injurers; KD and KP represent the litigation
costs for the defendant and plaintiﬀ, respectively; c(y,n) represents the expenditures on accident
prevention; µ is the probability of an accident; H represents the harm (damage) an accident causes
to society, conditional on the occurrence of an accident;72 fA(1−q)
A+KD is the conditional probability of
trial; and (KD + KP) are the resources spent on litigation when a trial occurs (litigation costs).
Given that µ = φλ(y1)+( 1− φ)λ(y2), µc =( 1− φ)λ(y2), and (1 − q) is the probability that a
defendant has been careful conditional on the occurrence of an accident, then (1−q)=
µc
µ . Hence,
the social welfare loss function can be rewritten as
CS =[ φc1(y,n1)+( 1− φ)c2(y,n2)] + µH +
fA
A + KD
µc(KP + KD). (C2)
The ﬁrst term of this expression [φc1(y,n1)+(1−φ)c2(y,n2)] represents the aggregate expenditures
on accident prevention. Assuming that the high-type ﬁrms just meet the standard, a decrease in f
reduces the level of care of ﬁrms of the low-type and does not aﬀect the level of care of ﬁrms of the
high-type intervals. Therefore the aggregate expenditures on accident prevention must decrease.
The second term µH is the unconditional expected damage that accidents cause to society. We
know that a decrease in f lowers the level of care and, therefore, increases the probability of an
accident µ, so we can conclude that a decrease in f increases the unconditional expected damage
that accidents cause to society. The third term
fA
A+KDµc(KP + KD) denotes the unconditional
expected litigation costs, where
fA
A+KDµc is the unconditional probability of trial. Assuming that
the high-type ﬁrms just meet the standard of care,73 a reduction in f reduces the unconditional
72Given that we abstract from the compensatory award in the litigation analysis, we also abstract here from the
direct monetary damage to the plaintiﬀ.
73If we assume, however, that the high-type ﬁrms exceed the standard of care, then the eﬀect of f on the uncon-
ditional expected litigation costs is ambiguous. When f goes down, ineﬃcient defendants remain negligent, but they
reduce the level of care; eﬃcient defendants remain careful, but they also reduce the level of care.
43probability of trial. Hence, if the level of the harm an accident causes to society is suﬃciently low
(for a particular value of f), we may expect that split-awards decrease the social costs of accidents.
When y is large enough (which can be interpreted as overdeterrence), the positive eﬀect of the
split-award reform outweighs the negative eﬀect. In fact, for suﬃciently large values of y, λ(y)
approaches zero. Therefore, a marginal change in f has almost no impact on the probability of
accident and, therefore, almost no eﬀect on the unconditional expected damage that accidents cause
to society. In addition, given that in our framework low-type defendants always ﬁnd it optimal
to be negligent and high-type defendants ﬁnd it optimal to be careful, a negligible impact on the
probability of accident implies a negligible impact on the probability of trial. Hence the only
non-negligible (and positive) welfare eﬀect of lower f will be the eﬀect on reducing the aggregate
expenditures on accident prevention.
The overall welfare eﬀect of the split-award reform is then ambiguous: there is a positive eﬀect due to the lower
spending on care, a negative eﬀect due to a higher probability of accident. The ambiguity comes from the eﬀect of f
on the conditional probability of trial.
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46Table 1: Expected Direction of the Eﬀects of the Split-Award Statute
Split-Award
1. Expenditure on Care decreases
2. Conditional Probability of Trial decreases
3. Expected Total Litigation Costs decreases
4. Defendant’s Proposal decreases
5. Plaintiﬀ’s Rejection Threshold decreases
6. Defendant’s Expected Litigation Loss decreases
7. Plaintiﬀ’s Expected Net Compensation decreases
47Table 2: Mean Expenditures on Care, Dispute Rate and Mean Total Litigation Costs
Expenditures Dispute Total Litigation
on Care Rate Costs
Split-Award 38.47 .314 61.54
(22.11) (.13) (26.65)
[n = 17] [n = 13] [n = 13]
No Split-Award 37.44 0.88 176.47
(20.89) (.08) (16.11)
[n = 18] [n = 17] [n = 17]
` U 0.14 − -3 . 6 0
p .889 .002 .000
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; sample sizes are in brackets; for the ﬁrst and third
columns, p-values correspond to two-sided robust rank-order statistic test; for the second column,
p-value corresponds to two-sided Fisher exact statistic test.
48Table 3: Plaintiﬀ’s Rejection Threshold and Mean Defendant’s Proposal
Plaintiﬀ’s Rejection Defendant’s
Threshold Proposal
Split-Award 130 165.58
[n = 12] (−) (13.06)
No Split-Award 310 211.67
[n = 12] (−) (26.55)
− ` U = - 1.12
− p>. 10
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; sample size are in brackets; p-value corresponds to
two-sided robust rank-order statistic test.
49Table 4: Mean Defendant’s Litigation Loss and Mean Plaintiﬀ’s Net Compensation
Defendant’s Plaintiﬀ’s
Litigation Loss Net Compensation
Split-Award 229.38 129.38
[n = 13] (47.13) (29.73)
No Split-Award 542.06 365.59
[n = 17] (34.03) (29.58)
` U -4 . 8 2 -8 . 1 2
p .000 .000
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; sample size are in brackets; p-values correspond to
two-sided robust rank-order statistic test.
50Table 5: Quantitative Theoretical Predictions and Experimental Results
Predicted Actual
Split-Award
1. Expenditures on Care 6.40 38.47
2. Dispute Rate 0.048 0.31
3. Total Litigation Costs 9.60 61.54
4. Defendant’s Proposal 150.00 165.58
5. Plaintiﬀ’s Rejection Threshold 150.00 130.00
6. Defendant’s Litigation Loss 135.61 229.38
7. Plaintiﬀ’s Net Compensation 121.21 129.38
No-Split Award
1. Expenditures on Care 24.60 37.44
2. Dispute Rate 0.067 0.88
3. Total Litigation Costs 13.41 176.47
4. Defendant’s Proposal 400.00 211.67
5. Plaintiﬀ’s Rejection Threshold 400.00 310.00
6. Defendant’s Litigation Loss 373.18 542.06
7. Plaintiﬀ’s Net Compensation 359.77 365.59
51FIGURE 1
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN THE GAME
Nature decides D’s type i
D chooses level of care y
Accident does
not occur Game ends
Accident occurs
D damages P
P ﬁles a lawsuit
D makes an oﬀer S P accepts Game ends
P rejects KP, KD
Trial
No award
y ≥ ¯ y Game ends
Court awards A
y<¯ y
Game ends
Note: D = defendant, P = plaintiﬀ, KD = defendant’s litigation costs, KP = plaintiﬀ’s
litigation costs, A = punitive damage award, ¯ y = negligence standard.
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